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ABSTRACT

Over the past 50 years, scholars have examined the effects of industrial activity on the
natural environment and why firms should willingly spend resources to reduce their
environmental impacts. While scholars have identified numerous economic benefits that accrue
to firms prioritizing environmental performance, firms still vary considerably in the manner and
extent to which they address their hazardous waste. Recent studies have placed an emphasis on
business context and what differentiates firms’ responses to societal concerns. However, we still
know very little about how divided corporate ownership influences environmental outcomes.
This dissertation examines whether, when, and why divided corporate ownership affects the
emission and mitigation of hazardous waste known to adversely impact human health.
I first ask whether and when divided ownership influences facilities’ emissions and
mitigation of hazardous waste and examine if perceived harm (cancerous and non-cancerous
hazards) encourages greater precautions. I then take a closer examination of JV ownership
coalitions to explore the mechanisms by which divided ownership influences the mitigation,
namely the recycling and treatment, of cancerous and non-cancerous hazardous waste. I find
robust empirical evidence that co-ownership, ownership dispersion (i.e. the number of partners
and their balance of equity), the types of owners collaborating in a JV, coalition heterogeneity,
and chemical classifications influence the extent and manner in which JV facilities address their
hazardous byproducts.

ii

Overall, this dissertation demonstrates when co-ownership detracts from environmental
performance and broadens theoretical accounts of ownership’s nuanced social sensitivity to
hazardous externalities.

Keywords: Joint Ventures, Environmental Performance, Hazardous Emissions, Pollution
Mitigation, Ownership Dispersion, Coalition Heterogeneity
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Chapter 1:
INTRODUCTION

For over 50 years, business scholars have examined the environmental consequences of
industrial activity. While society accepts that some hazardous byproducts are a natural result of
production (Coase, 1988), scholars have increasingly studied the reasons why firms should
voluntarily spend additional resources to go above and beyond legal requirements to protect the
general public from known harm. Normative prescriptions of moral duty have exhibited only
limited success in changing organizational behaviour, so emphasis has shifted towards enticing
firms to mitigate harm by building the business case for environmental sustainability and
identifying how it “pays” (Griffin & Mahon, 2003; Margolis & Walsh, 2001; Roman, Hayibor,
& Agle, 1999; Burke & Logsdon, 1996). Moral-duty perspectives remain, but, increasingly,
scholars recognize that change will occur more quickly by linking sustainability to traditional
organizational objectives (Marcus & Fremeth, 2009).
Many studies in the 1990s and 2000s appealed to the economic self-interest of
organizations by establishing the link between environmental and financial performance. For
example, scholars have theorized and found evidence that pursuits of environmental performance
improve financial performance by creating strategic benefits (Porter & van der Linde, 1995),
providing learning opportunities (Larpe, Mukherjee, & Van Wassenhove, 2000), reducing risks
(Shrivastava, 1995) and liabilities (Rooney, 1993), lowering the costs of capital (Sharfman &
Fernando, 2008), lowering costs of materials usage (Hart, 1995) and hazardous waste disposal
fees (Young, 1991), increasing sales (Bagnoli & Watts, 2003), and improving production
efficiency (Sprinkle & Maines, 2010; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Waddock & Graves, 1997).
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Meta-analyses concur that pursuits of the common good can pay off or break even
without sacrificing profits (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Reynes,
2003), but others highlight that firms pursue environmental sustainability when it pays not
necessarily because it pays (Reinhardt & Stavins, 2010; van de Ven & Jeurissen, 2005). In other
words, firms evaluate the economic and/or strategic advantages of socially beneficial
investments and pursue them when the predicted returns exceed their costs. Despite all the
advantages associated with a corporate focus on environmental performance, a wide and
persistent variance in environmental outcomes still separates those firms embracing
environmental sustainability from those avoiding the topic altogether.
This research is inspired by an interest in understanding why seemingly similar
organizations differ in the extent to which they control foreseeable harm arising from their
activities. Neither the traditional normative prescriptions for moral duty nor the profit-enticing
empirical accounts appear adequately equipped to answer systematic sources of variance in
environmental outcomes. A growing consensus of executives recognize the importance of
working within society’s expectations and avoiding activities that societies deem unacceptable
(Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2004), calling into question a lack of conviction to address
stakeholders who increasingly expect firms to reduce their environmental impacts. Further, “two
decades of tightening regulatory rules and legal threats have led many businesspeople to assume
that any hazards and harms that their enterprise engenders, even if not clearly illegal today, will
sooner or later be subject to public censure, government action, and legal liability” (p. 308),
calling into question a strategic choice to ignore environmental hazards or an inability to
recognize their importance.
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More recent extensions within the sustainability literature focus upon firms’ differences
and their unique sensitivities to the costs and benefits of environmental performance (van de Ven
& Jeurissen, 2005). Herein lies the frontier of sustainability research – determining when, why,
and how situational context matters to environmental performance. Different types of
organizations have differential access to resources that can affect their costs for social
investments (Darnall & Edwards, 2006). Different firms have different constituencies exhibiting
unique environmental preferences (Sharma, 2000; Branzei et al., 2004). Certain types of firms,
such as publically traded corporations, find themselves more exposed to public scrutiny than
others, leading them to invest more heavily in the common good (Lee, 2009). Owners account
for value differently, which can differentiate social investments (Berrone et al., 2010; Westhead,
Cowling, & Howorth, 2001; Birley, Ng, & Godfrey, 1999; Fletcher, 2000).
While research is beginning to uncover why individual firms, given their unique
situational contexts, differ in the extent to which they invest in the common good, we still know
very little about how joint-venture (JV) partnerships between firms, each with unique
preferences, affect environmental outcomes. Reconciling social investments with financial
objectives is difficult enough for individual firms (Margolis et al., 2007; van de Ven & Jeurissen,
2005). Reconciling social investments with multiple organizations’ unique characteristics,
constituencies, preferences, and financial objectives appears to be a formidable challenge.
In August 2011, ConocoPhillips was blamed for an oil spill off of China’s coast in the
Bohai Sea; in April 2012, the company agreed to pay approximately $297 million in
compensation (Rapoza, 2012). ConocoPhillips, the minority operating partner of a 51-49% jointventure (JV) with the China National Overseas Oil Corporation (CNOOC), immediately notified
the Chinese government about the spill, but clean-up operations were delayed for weeks.
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ConocoPhillips complained that its joint-venture partner prevented containment of the spill in a
timely manner (Watts, 2011). CNOOC had allegedly insisted on contracting with one of its
Chinese affiliate companies for environmental emergencies rather than using ConocoPhillips’
own service provider, which could respond to environmental emergencies anywhere in the world
within 24 hours. These co-ordination challenges for building social value through protecting the
environment eventually resulted in an uncontained oil spill the size of London (U.K.),
significantly affecting the Chinese fishing and tourism industries (Kuang et al., 2012).
This incident, and especially the division of interest and blame between the two partners,
provides anecdotal evidence that co-ownership creates difficulties for co-ordinating collective
action for environmental objectives. It raises important new questions for sustainability scholars
about the role corporate ownership plays in environmental performance – specifically, how and
why co-ownership influences JV’s ability to reduce environmental impacts.
In this thesis, I take an in-depth examination of co-ownership to explore whether, when,
why, and how co-ownership influences two aspects of environmental performance – hazardous
emissions and pollution mitigation. I explore not only the additional challenges that JV
organizations face in identifying common interests and agreeing upon collective action, but also
how the characteristics of a JV’s ownership coalition and its members systematically influence
cancerous and non-cancerous waste processing. I find strong evidence that co-ownership, the
characteristics of JV partners, and the characteristics of the ownership coalition influence the
extent to which facilities address hazardous byproducts.
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1.1 Joint Ventures and Environmental Performance
Joint-venture (JV) scholars have long recognized the challenges of co-ordinating multiple
owners’ divergent interests (Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; Cartwright & Zander, 1968; van de
Ven, 1976) at the facility level (Harrigan, 1988; Gill & Butler, 1996), which become increasingly
complicated with additional owners (Graicunas, 1937). I argue that divided corporate ownership
undermines partners’ ability to identify, agree, and act upon common interests for pursuing the
common good.
JVs rely heavily upon partitioning and specialization in the components of private
property (Alchian, 2008). In forming equity JVs, corporate partners pool their resources to create
a separate legal entity that produces some product that the individual firms cannot efficiently
produce independently (Das & Teng, 2000). Regardless of the root cause of the inefficiency,
each parent firm seeks complementary resources that make the enterprise viable. When JV
partners dedicate resources to the enterprise, they increase the risk of expropriation by releasing
control over corporate assets to a separate legal entity with multiple property rights holders
(Mahoney, 2005).
To manage this additional risk, JV partners negotiate a contract (a.k.a. partnership
agreement) that defines each partner’s rights to residual claimancy and control (Libecap, 1989),
rights of monitoring and governance (Reuer, Ariño, & Mellewigt, 2006; Kumar & Seth, 1998),
and roles and responsibilities (Gulati & Singh, 1998). In negotiating the contractual agreement,
partner firms attempt to build in protections against value expropriation (Williamson, 1991)
while seeking to maximize their private net gains (Libecap, 1989). While these ex-ante
guidelines protect individual owners’ interests, they also impede efficient decision making
(Pearce, 1997) and create structural rigidities (Mahoney, 2005; Barzel, 1997) resistant to change
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(Libecap, 1989). Thus, JVs appear to face greater challenges in coordinating collective action for
pursuing socially beneficial investments.
JV scholars provide several guideposts that identify how much ownership corresponds to
an equity JV where minority partners actively engage in the venture, because very small equity
owners may simply invest in the enterprise without actively participating. While anecdotal
evidence and previous studies suggest that a minority partners can, at least, partially control a JV
(Geringer & Herbert, 1989; Mjöen & Tallman, 1997), scholars propose that the minimum
minority ownership for equity joint-ventures ranges between five percent (Killing, 1983) to
twenty percent (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004). I first adopt Dhanaraj & Beamish’s (2004) more
conservative twenty percent threshold to examine the differences between equity JVs and
independent firms and to ensure coordination challenges are present among JV co-owners. I
then adopt the more liberal threshold to examine differences among JVs because I argue that
different levels, types, and configurations of ownership influence the manner in which facilities
deal with hazardous waste.1
In Chapter 2, “The Environmental Consequences of (un)Divided Ownership,” I focus on
how and why environmental decisions differ for JVs and independent organizations and,
subsequently, how these differences affect hazardous emissions and pollution mitigation for
substances with known cancerous and non-cancerous properties. Unlike their independent peers,
when making equity allocations, JV partners face a trade-off between investment incentives and
control-benefits extraction (Hauswald & Hege, 2009). JVs inherently raise owners’ concerns
about control (Wang & Zhu, 2005; Kumar & Seth, 1998; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997), cost

1

All of the results in this thesis are robust to examining the population of JVs using a 1% equity threshold. These
results are available from the author upon request.
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spillovers (Richards & Yang, 2007), and benefit capture (Killing, 1983; Gulati & Singh, 1998)
and focus owners’ attention on who contributes, who benefits, and how from each investment
decision (Mahoney, 2005; Libecap, 1989; Barzel, 1997). Despite these difficulties, JV owners
frequently align their interests to collectively pursue additional economic efficiencies (Das &
Teng, 2000).
Nonetheless, economic and environmental efficiencies are not always aligned;
environmental performance typically requires trade-offs (Husted & Salazar, 2006). These tradeoffs are not exogenously determined, as JV partners tend to face the same regulatory constraints
and institutional pressures as their independent peers. As regulation increases and society
increasingly focuses on industrial byproducts, more convergence in environmental outcomes
would be expected across facilities and firms, regardless of ownership.
However, the challenges of aligning multiple owners’ interests (Killing, 1983; Parkhe,
1993; Cartwright & Zander, 1968) could undermine investments in the common good when
financial returns remain uncertain or incalculable. Divided ownership complicates trade-off
decisions, reduces strategic flexibility, and impedes structural adaptability (Mahoney, 2005;
Barzel, 1997; Libecap, 1989) because JVs must work within the confines of negotiated terms
(Killing, 1983). Environmental performance investments are understood as purchases of a public
good (Reinhardt, 1999, 1998) that require an extensive amount of sustained effort (Marcus &
Fremeth, 2009; Falck & Heblich, 2007; King & Lennox, 2002; Klassen & Whybark, 1999) for
distant and uncertain future benefits (Economist, 2009; Elkington, 1998). If any partner remains
unwilling to make such an investment, the other partners must either forgo environmental
performance investments or choose to incur a disproportionate cost for improving environmental
outcomes.
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I argue that co-ordination challenges reduce the odds of achieving consensus for
environmental performance initiatives. As a result, I expect that JV facilities produce more
hazardous waste, emit more hazardous waste, and address less hazardous waste through pollution
mitigation than individually owned facilities. However, I also theorize that social forces, in the
form of increased liability and perceived differential harm, will influence the extent to which JV
facilities differ from independent facilities in the manner in which they deal with their cancerous
and non-cancerous waste. I test these arguments through adopting a quasi-experimental,
matched-pair design, a method of causal inference (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002), that contrasts
Canadian independent and joint-venture facilities who disclosed their hazardous emissions and
abatement efforts to Environment Canada between 2004 and 2009.
While Chapter 2 focuses on differences between JVs and independent firms, Chapter 3,
“JV Ownership Coalitions and Environmental Performance,” examines how and why JVs differ
from one another in pollution mitigation – namely, the recycling and treatment of hazardous
waste. Scholars theorize that firms pursue (or refrain from) environmental sustainability for
instrumental reasons (Lynch-Wood & Williamson, 2007; Hawkins & Hutter, 1993), ranging on a
continuum from moral-duty to profit-maximization (van de Ven & Jeurissen, 2005; Scalise,
2005; Cox & Hazen, 2003). In Chapter 3, I argue that the characteristics of a JV’s ownership
coalition and the characteristics of the coalition’s members shift the extent to which JVs exhibit a
moral-duty or profit-maximization tendency.
I argue that ownership dispersion – that is, more owners with more balanced equity
stakes – undermines partners’ ability to identify, agree, and act upon common interests for
pursuing the common good, thus shifting the JV’s tendency toward profit maximization.
However, I further argue that who sits at the table also matters; different types of owners have
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different costs (Darnall & Edwards, 2006), stakeholders (Darnall, Potoski, & Prakash, 2010;
Darnall, Henriquez, & Sadorsky, 2009), and preferences (Berrone et al., 2010; Schulze et al.,
2001) that influence the extent to which managers gravitate toward moral-duty or profitmaximization perspectives. To test these arguments, I examine the effects of JV ownership
dispersion, types of partners, and coalition heterogeneity on pollution mitigation for JVs
reporting to Environment Canada’s National Pollution Release Inventory between 2004 and
2009.
1.2 Intended Contribution
The intended theoretical contribution of this dissertation is explaining why and how the
decision to collectively organize for production has consequences for how owners see and
negotiate the interface between business and society. I explain and empirically find that coownership has predictable environmental consequences. However, JV owners can and do
overcome co-ordination challenges to reduce hazardous emissions and improve pollution
mitigation for facility byproducts perceived to be the most detrimental to human health.
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Chapter 2:
The Environmental Consequences
of (un)Divided Ownership

Environmental performance has preoccupied management scholars since the late 1950s.
The sustainability literature has evolved through several distinct periods (Marcus & Fremeth,
2009), from humble beginnings creating awareness, to exploring ethical mandates (Levit, 1958)
and moral responsibility (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), to building a business case for
sustainability (Porter & van der Linde, 1995), to explicitly questioning the financial returns of
environmentally responsible business practices and measuring the environmental impact of
hazardous waste (King & Lenox, 2002; Russo & Fouts, 1997). While a growing consensus
asserts that the benefits of environmental performance outweigh its costs (Reinhardt & Stavins,
2010; Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007; Roman, Hayibor, & Agle, 1999; Russo & Fouts,
1997), organizations still differ considerably in the manner and extent to which they address their
hazardous byproducts.
Some scholars ascribe variances in environmental performance to differences in
corporate ownership (Darnall & Edwards, 2006; King & Shaver, 2001; Margolis & Walsh, 2001;
Sethi, 2003). For instance, some argue that long-term institutional ownership increases
investments in the common good because managers depend upon long-term investors who
actively monitor firms and have more to gain from social investments (Neubaum & Zahara,
2006; Johnson & Greening, 1999). Berrone et al. (2010) aver that family-controlled firms exhibit
greater environmental performance because family owners attain additional non-economic value
from social investments, such as an enhanced family reputation. Yet, others theorize and find
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evidence that public firms exhibit greater environmental performance because they are more
visible and face greater societal pressures (Lee, 2009).
While these studies highlight how and why different kinds of owners influence firms’
environmental outcomes, the question of co-ownership has not received much theoretical or
empirical attention. The only study I found on co-ownership and environmental performance
examined firms’ use of one hazardous chemical. Lee (2009) found that joint ventures emitted
more benzene than did public firms, and he attributed this finding to the increased visibility of
public firms. Because co-ownership partially shelters corporate owners from public scrutiny, Lee
(2009) suggests that JVs are more likely to engage in incidental wrongdoing (Bazerman &
Tenbrunsel, 2011; Palmer, 2012).
I extend Lee’s study and contribute to prior research on ownership and environmental
performance by examining whether, how, when, theoretically why, and to what extent divided
corporate ownership influences the emission and mitigation of hazardous byproducts. Divided
ownership elucidates decision processes that independent firms take for granted because partners
place additional emphasis on who contributes, who benefits, and how from each investment
decision (Libecap, 1989). Each owner brings a unique mix of constituents and priorities that
influence not only its own environmental strategy (Sharma, 2000) but also its social investments
and expected returns from these investments (Berrone et al., 2010; Branzei et al., 2004). Any
investment decisions made by co-owned facilities are more heavily scrutinized by multiple
parties on a cost-benefit basis, and the allocation of costs and returns may be disputable. If one or
more partners remain unwilling to invest in environmental initiatives, other partners must either
opt out all together or choose to incur a disproportionate cost for improving environmental
outcomes. As a result, divided corporate ownership increases the difficulty of co-ordination
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(Killing, 1983; Parkhe, 1993; Cartwright & Zander, 1968) and reduces the odds of achieving
consensus (Kim & Mahoney, 2002).
I examine these arguments in the context of hazardous emissions and pollution mitigation
for over 300 hazardous chemicals used by Canadian facilities and reported to the National
Pollution Release Inventory (NPRI) between 2004 and 2009. The NPRI provides an ideal setting
in which to examine the effects of divided ownership because Environment Canada sets and
enforces systematic standards for reporting, reports facility performance publicly, and facilitates
comparisons across environmental outcomes and/or industries. I focus specifically on the facility
level of analysis because facilities represent the key unit of intervention and accrual for
environmental activities (Environment Canada, 2012; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
2012a).
I find that divisions of ownership are consequential: co-owned facilities, on average, emit
approximately 74% more hazardous byproducts than do their single-owned peers.
2.1 THEORY & HYPOTHESES
I define a joint-venture as a common legal organization where two or more firms pool a
portion of their resources (Kogut, 1988) to produce some product or service that collaboration
makes more lucrative (Das & Teng, 2000). I adopt Dhanaraj & Beamish’s (2004) more
conservative definition of an equity JV, namely a JV where at least one minority partner holds a
minimum of twenty percent equity, to provide added assurance that at least two partners are
actively participating in the venture.
JVs tend to be highly customized (Turowski, 2005), but one characteristic that
distinguishes JVs from their independent peers is the transaction costs associated with shared
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ownership. The JV literature examines transaction costs from two distinct vantage points. The
first examines the JV organizational form as a mechanism for corporations to reduce transaction
costs by building economies of scale (Dyer, 1997; Hennart, 1988), overcoming knowledge
asymmetries (Inkpen, 2000; Chi & McGuire, 1996), gaining entry into new markets (Delios &
Beamish, 1999; Makino & Neupert, 2000; Beamish & Banks, 1987), and subjugating
opportunism (Crook et al., 2013; Williamson, 1991). The second examines the increased
transaction costs associated with owners bridging differences and making decisions within the
JV organizational form (Pearce, 1997). I extend this second account from economic
considerations to environmental outcomes.
I argue that coordinating social investments generally, and environmental investments
more specifically, is more challenging for JVs, because each owner has to incur immediate costs
for distant and uncertain shared future benefits (Slawinski, 2010; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001; Hart
& Ahuja, 1996; Elkington, 1988). Investing in projects with immediate costs and ambiguous and
uncertain returns could prove especially problematic for co-owners mindful of proportionally
allocating costs and benefits (Barzel, 1997; Libecap, 1989; Demsetz, 1967) because of the
increased likelihood of cost and benefit spillovers. Even when partners are willing to discuss the
allocation itself, their attempt to establish criteria for proportional contributions and gains
significantly and often suddenly magnifies coordination costs. Although co-owners can discuss
and agree on precautionary or protective measures, they will struggle to track costs over the
long-term and/or to protect benefits they cannot readily observe.
2.2 JVs and Hazardous Waste Volume
The sustainability literature recognizes that hazardous byproducts are a combined
function of production; pollution prevention, which attempts to remove hazardous byproducts
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from the production lifecycle; and pollution mitigation,2 which attempts to safely dispose of
hazardous waste once it occurs (King & Shaver, 2001; Klassen & Whybark, 1999). Pollution
prevention refers to any proactive measures that integrate environmental concerns into product
design and process technologies and that subsequently influence the types of pollutants emitted,
the hazardous byproducts generated, and the energy consumed in the production process
(Klassen, 2002; Judge & Douglas, 1998). Pollution mitigation, in contrast, refers to the recycling
and treatment of hazardous waste prior to disposal.
JVs could produce greater volumes of hazardous waste because they forego pollution
prevention measures that eliminate hazardous waste before it occurs (King & Lenox, 2002).3 The
benefits of pollution prevention are oftentimes unobservable (King & Lenox, 2002; Klassen &
Whybark, 1999; Hart & Ahuja, 1996) and incalculable (Elkington, 1998). Even when JVs can
foresee environmental benefits, attaining them takes time and money: pollution prevention
requires a long-term (Arora & Cason, 1995), sustained (Hirschhorn, 1994) commitment of
resources, while its positive yet uncertain effects accrue in the distant future (Slawinski, 2010).
Investing in projects with immediate costs and ambiguous and uncertain returns (Sarkis
& Cordeiro, 2001; Hart & Ahuja, 1996) appears especially problematic for co-owners mindful of
proportionally allocating costs and benefits (Barzel, 1997; Libecap, 1989; Demsetz, 1967)
because of the increased likelihood of cost and benefit spillovers. This makes it more likely for

2

Some sustainability scholars use the term pollution control rather than pollution mitigation to refer to end-of-pipe
measures such as the recycling and treatment of hazardous waste. However, the public policy literature uses the term
pollution control to refer to legal and regulatory requirements (Lin & Darnall, 2010) for pollution abatement. I use
the term pollution mitigation to avoid any misunderstandings surrounding the definition of pollution control.
3

JVs could also differ in hazardous emissions and pollution mitigation due to larger production volumes, since those
facilities that produce more typically create more hazardous byproducts (Harrison & Antweiler, 2003; Antweiler &
Harrison, 2003). JV scholars have long-emphasized economies of scale as one of the primary motivations for jointventuring (Shapiro & Willig, 1990; Kogut, 1988; Hennart, 1988; Contractor & Lorange, 1988).
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one or more of the partners to decline or delay needed investments, which unevens the costbenefit calculations and adds further coordination challenges to all the JV partners. Even when
co-owners can discuss and agree on precautionary or protective measures, they will struggle to
track costs over the long-term and/or to protect benefits they cannot readily observe.
I therefore predict that joint-venture facilities produce more hazardous byproducts than
do their single-owned peers, because divided ownership makes it more difficult (costly and
complex) to agree upon and implement pollution prevention measures.
Hypothesis 1: JV facilities produce more hazardous byproducts than do single-owned
facilities.
2.3 Environmental Trade-offs
Divided ownership may constitute an influencing factor in the way facilities deal with the
hazardous products of their activities. The classic trade-off set-up in the sustainability literature
is economic: because emitting is cheaper and mitigation is more expensive, managers that focus
upon profit-maximization will opt for more emissions and/or less mitigation. This trade-off may
be sharper for JVs for a couple reasons. First, JVs have a clear economic value-creation mandate
(Killing, 1983), which increases the saliency of costs and benefits for all owners, directing
attention to economic considerations (Barzel, 1997; Libecap, 1989). Second, when facilities have
multiple owners, their different calculations of costs and benefits re-activate economic
considerations on an ongoing basis (Mahoney, 2005; Libecap, 1989).
But some owners also make environmental trade-offs: they compare the environmental
pains and gains of different ways of dealing with hazardous byproducts (Sarkis & Cordeiro,
2001; El-Halwagi, 1997). Emitting comes with serious environmental consequences, which can
be costly for owners – but not necessarily equally costly for all owners. When there are multiple
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owners, these pains may be diluted or diverted to a different partner. Pollution mitigation
provides some environmental gains, but these too may be unevenly diffused and distributed
among multiple partners. Environmental trade-offs may be less influential for JVs compared to
their single-owned peers because divided corporate ownership disassociates pains and gains
through delegating operational and executive control, ex-ante guidelines, and/or routines that
constrain even the best-intended co-owners from considering environmental concerns (Pearce,
1997).
Across facilities, social scrutiny can also motivate the reduction of emissions and/or
greater mitigation. Social scholars suggest that public scrutiny provides incentives for favouring
pollution mitigation over emissions (Langpap, 2007; Lynch-Wood & Williamson, 2007). For
example, the appearance of doing good builds goodwill that subsequently establishes
commitment to a company’s stock and products (Margolis et al., 2007). On the other hand, firms
that violate the public’s expectations can bring about swift recourse in the form of reputational
damage, decreased sales, and progressively stringent regulation (Gunningham, Kagan, &
Thornton, 2004).
I argue that the effectiveness of social scrutiny is diminished when multiple owners are
involved, because the effectiveness of social pressures will be diluted when multiple owners are
involved. An independent owner has complete control over the operations of a facility and
therefore presumably has direct responsibility for its emission and mitigation of hazardous
byproducts. Attribution theory suggests that assigning responsibility for good or bad outcomes is
relatively easy in cases of single ownership (Teigen & Brun, 2011; Shaver, 1996), but external
observers struggle to assign accolades or blame to multiple causal agents (Teigen & Brun, 2011;
Sanders & Hamilton, 1997; Shaver, 1996) embedded within complex organizations (Gailey &
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Lee, 2005; Sanders & Hamilton, 1997). To hold individual JV owners accountable, observers
must disentangle the JV’s ownership structure to determine who is responsible, and in what
proportion, within the embedded principal-agent relationships of a JV.
I therefore predict that, compared to their independently owned peers, co-owned facilities
will emit more and mitigate less hazardous byproducts.
Hypothesis 2A: JV facilities emit more hazardous byproducts than do single-owned
facilities.
Hypothesis 2B: JV facilities mitigate less hazardous byproducts than do single-owned
facilities.
2.4 Legal Considerations
Facility owners are not always free to choose the way they deal with hazardous
byproducts, even if they bypass public scrutiny when considering environmental trade-offs.
Laws and regulations constrain corporate behaviour by setting limits on emissions; they create
and enforce expectations by providing legal demands to work within these constraints and legal
recourse against firms who ignore them.
However, laws and regulations are not always effective at influencing pollution
abatement. Many claim that existing laws and regulations fail to provide enough incentive to
encourage environmentally responsible behaviour (Gunningham et al., 2004). Some argue that
the costs of compliance exceed the costs of non-compliance (Lanoie, Laplante, & Roy, 1997;
Russell, 1990), and environmental agencies oftentimes lack the resources for effective
enforcement (Russell, 1990). I argue that divided ownership will influence the effectiveness of
specific laws and regulations on the emissions and mitigation of hazardous byproducts. I explore
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this argument using the legal liability regimes which predetermine the allocation of
environmental pains, or legal liability, when multiple partners are involved.
Legal liability regimes that govern business within a political jurisdiction define firms’
potential liability in cases of environmental harm. In cases of divided ownership, the liability of
the partners does not necessarily reflect their ownership shares (Wright, 1988). Typically,
plaintiffs hold the joint-venture liable for its own actions, and penalties are allocated
proportionally to corporate owners. However, in cases of insolvency, undercapitalization, or
negligence, different jurisdictions specify how strictly property rights assignments are externally
enforced (Grady, 1990). Some Canadian provinces restrict potential liabilities on a basis of
proportional responsibility, while others disconnect ex-ante responsibilities from ex-post
penalties for wrongdoing.
Joint-and-several liability regimes treat defendant firms more harshly (Kornhauser &
Revesz, 2009; Kornhauser & Revesz, 1994) and provide victims with certain added protections
against wrongdoing (Dopuch, Ingberman & King, 1997); plaintiffs can hold any solvent partner
fully liable for damages incurred (Kornhauser & Revesz, 2009; Vandall, 2000; Wright, 1988).
Businesses frequently complain, however, that joint-and-several liability encourages
unmeritorious lawsuits (Palmrose, 1994-1995: 54). These regimes likely encourage additional
preventative care because JV partners increasingly seek to find shared priorities, and, as
enforcement increases, to act on these priorities so they can anticipate and mitigate penalties
disproportionate to the bundles they own (Grady, 1990).
Proportional liability regimes, in contrast, appear to provide fewer incentives for
addressing hazardous externalities in cases of divided ownership. Proportional liability provides
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JV partners with added protections by limiting their liability to the proportion of their
responsibility for wrongdoings (Kornhauser & Revesz, 2009; AAMDC, 2010). In these regimes,
plaintiffs must individually sue each potentially culpable party to recover full damages, thus
increasing plaintiffs’ costs, discouraging lawsuits, and preventing disproportional penalties.
Co-owners in stricter liability regimes share a common interest in mitigating potential
disproportionate liabilities. I therefore expect that JV facilities in stricter liability regimes will
emit less and mitigate more hazardous waste than will all other facilities.
Hypothesis 3A: JV facilities in joint-and-several liability regimes emit less hazardous
byproducts than do all other facilities.
Hypothesis 3B: JV facilities in joint-and-several liability regimes mitigate more
hazardous byproducts than do all other facilities.
2.5 Categories of Harm
People agree that corporate actions should not harm bystanders (van de Ven & Jeurissen,
2005; Gunningham et al., 2004), and Donaldson & Dunfee (2000) point to a significant and
growing global consensus around the moral authority of such transcultural norms. Consistent
with the precepts of major religions and philosophies, global industry and professional standards,
and the laws of multiple countries (Dunfee, 2006), these “hyper-norms,” which emphasize the
avoidance of harm, drive managerial behaviour and sometimes substitute for the absence or
ineffectiveness of laws and regulations (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994: 265). Thus, perceptions of
harm should influence the relationship between divided ownership and the choices facilities
make to address their hazardous byproducts.
Classifications of harm represent one characteristic of hazardous byproducts that
influences these perceptions. Federal and non-profit organizations classify chemicals according
to the numerous dimensions that capture their hazardous impacts on humans and the natural
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environment. Cancerous and non-cancerous human health impact classifications are fairly
common across scales (Toffel & Marshall, 2004; Bare et al., 2003; McKone & Hertwich, 2001).
Classifying chemicals in this manner shapes the way people think about hazardous emissions
(Slovic, 1996). Such classifications not only stigmatize unambiguous harm (Berman &
Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989) but can also mislead some to believe that ambiguous harm is
less problematic. For example, some may consider the impacts of ‘non-cancerous’ chemicals as
somehow more manageable and/or less undesirable than those of ‘cancerous’ chemicals,
although exposure to non-cancerous emissions has deleterious effects, such as high rates of
chronic and acute respiratory illnesses, increased morbidity, and decreased life expectancy (Bare
et al., 2003).
The perceived undesirability of harm influences the likelihood that social observers will
blame and sanction organizations for wrongdoing (Lang & Washburn, 2012). The more severe
the perceived undesirability, the more likely such questionable behaviour will trigger feelings of
suffering, unfairness, and violations of in-group and out-group boundaries (Appiah, 2009).
Because all owners should see and agree that cancerous emissions are harmful, they have similar
inherent and external incentives to avoid such unambiguous harm. Thus, I do not expect that coownership contributes to differences in the emission or mitigation of cancerous chemicals.
Hypothesis 4: For cancerous byproducts, there is no difference between JV and single
owned facilities in a) emissions and b) mitigation.
Conversely, I hypothesize that ambiguous categories such as “non-cancerous” chemicals
leave room for interpretation, both among stakeholders and among owners. In such cases, JVs
may downplay environmental considerations and prioritize the economic trade-offs discussed
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above, emitting more and mitigating less of their non-cancerous hazardous byproducts than their
independently owned peers.
Hypothesis 5: For non-cancerous hazardous byproducts, JV facilities a) emit more and
b) mitigate less than single-owned facilities.
2.6 METHODS
2.6.1 Data and Sample
I examine the relationship between divided ownership, hazardous emissions, and
pollution mitigation by examining Canada’s legislated inventory of pollutant releases, named the
National Pollution Release Inventory (NPRI). Under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act
(CEPA 1999), Environment Canada is charged with collecting, compiling, and insuring the
accuracy of self-reported pollution data for over 8800 facilities exceeding chemical release
thresholds for at least one of over 300 tracked substances (Environment Canada, 2013a).
Environment Canada randomly conducts on-site visits to verify reported data, and if these audits
identify any inaccuracies, firms are legally obliged to correct their reports (Environment Canada,
2013b).
Reporting to the NPRI is mandatory under Canadian law, however, the NPRI does not
track all hazardous substances, and some facility sectors remain exempt from reporting
requirements. Federal law also provides exemptions for all facilities utilizing fewer than 20,000
annual man hours, the equivalent of 10 full-time employees, which prevents examining data for
the smallest Canadian facilities. A sector by sector analysis indicates that the percentage of
reporting facilities varies for the highest polluting industries (from 36 to 97%), due to these
exemptions, but NPRI coverage and compliance has increased substantially over time
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(Environment Canada, 2013c). I focus solely on industry sectors that contain JVs that reported to
the NPRI.4
Environment Canada periodically adds new chemicals to the reporting requirements,5
updates reporting and auditing procedures, and changes chemical report thresholds (Environment
Canada, 2013d, 2012). I included the last five years of publicly available data at the initiation of
the study (2004–2009), since changes to the NPRI reporting program and estimation procedures
make it difficult to clearly compare more recent data to earlier periods. 6 I verified the continuity
of reports across the five years,7 and the data appeared robust to potential reporting errors of
omission and commission, which affected less than one percent of the sample over the five-year
period. I corrected four obvious data-entry errors for facility size8 but made no further alterations
to the original data.
2.6.2 Empirical approach
I leveraged a quasi-experimental propensity score matched-pair design to empirically test
how divided ownership influences facility-level environmental performance. JV and independent
facilities differ on many characteristics, and any of these differences may introduce bias into
estimates. Randomizing facilities into treatment and control groups would overcome this

4

A list of industries included in this analysis is provided in Appendix B.

5

This study only observes chemicals that were tracked by Environment Canada as of 2004. A complete list of
chemicals observed in this study is provided in Appendix A.
6

2009 represented the last year of publically available data at the initiation of this study.

7

I reviewed entries year by year to flag and document any potential inconsistencies or disparities. I flagged
observations 1) where a facility consistently filed reports for four contiguous years and failed to provide a report in
one of the years in my sampling frame, 2) where a facility failed to report a chemical one year while consistently
reporting the chemical in previous and future years, 3) when a facility report on a specified chemical exceeded a
500% annual difference without being part of an apparent upward or downward trend for the facility’s use of that
chemical, and 4) where someone obviously made a data-entry error on the fields observed in this study.
8

None of the corrected records was chosen as a match by the propensity score matching algorithm used in this
study.
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challenge, but randomization is practically infeasible with observational data. Propensity score
matching (PSM) provides a feasible alternative to empirically singling out the effect of
ownership by maximizing comparability between treatment and control groups (Villalonga,
2004). PSM allows causal inference (Rosenbaum & Ruben, 1983) and yields unbiased estimates
in the absence of experimentation (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002) by pairing each co-owned facility
with an independently owned peer that is closely aligned on observable internal and external
characteristics.
Specifically, PSM uses a vector of the observable relevant differences to maximize the
comparability between two facilities in all respects except the predictor of interest. By comparing
facilities that closely resemble each other on all other observables, PSM effectively deals with
sample-selection bias on the predictor variable (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1998). In other
words, this approach ensures comparability of facilities that differ in ownership. This aspect is
important in general because ownership is a choice that occurs early in the life of the firm and
changes infrequently over time. Therefore, the same facility’s environmental performance cannot
typically be observed before and after a switch in ownership structure. The PSM approach
requires the inclusion of all relevant characteristics and assumes that any remaining unobserved
differences occur due to random chance, leaving open the possibility of selection bias on nonobserved characteristics.
I defined an equity JV as any co-owned facility where the second largest corporate parent
holds at least 20% ownership (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004), which provided a sample of 85 JV
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facilities9 that had filed 303 hazardous waste processing reports to the NPRI between 2004 and
2009. Table 1 provides a detailed description of the ownership configurations within these JVs
using Blodgett’s (1992) topology of JV ownership. I then used a PSM algorithm (Leuven &
Sianesi, 2003) to identify the nearest-neighbour independently owned facility for each co-owned
facility. I used matching with replacement to maximize comparability between treatment and
control observations, minimize selection biases for observable characteristics (Dehejia & Wahba,
2002), and avoid additional bias stemming from the order in which treatment units were matched
(Rosenbaum, 1995). Although matching with replacement can reduce the precision of estimates,
it is preferable in cases when there are few observable differences and when the number of close
matches remains questionable (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002).

Ownership
Category

Table 1: JV facility-year observations under different configurations of ownership

Number of Partners
2
3 4 5-6
Majority-Minority (32) 49 23 1 16
Slightly Unequal (14)
53
3 0
0
Dual Ownership (28)
103 0 0
0
Minority-Minority (11)
0
17 9 18

* The number of JV facilities per ownership category is provided in parentheses

Scholars emphasize that including variables that are weakly related to treatment
assignment typically reduces bias more than it increases variance, and, therefore, most believe
that all available controls should be included in matching algorithms (Rubin & Thomas, 1996;
Heckman et al., 1998), especially when the number of control observations vastly exceeds the
number of treatment observations (Ho et al., 2007), as in my data. Based on theoretical rationale
explained in greater detail below, I used all available, relevant, and observable characteristics for
9

I excluded one military joint venture (Canadian/U.S. SIC code 811/971), all independently owned military
facilities, and 3 equity JVs not meeting the ownership threshold defined by Dhanaraj & Beamish (2004) for equity
JVs. Including these facilities produced similar findings.
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the matching algorithm:10 the legal jurisdiction into which each facility falls (the province where
they are located), the three-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code, size (the number of
employees per facility), scale (the number of peer facilities sharing the same federal business
number), and impact (the number of chemicals processed by each facility).11 This approach
resulted in a final sample of 606 facility-year observations, including 249 facilities in 37
industries.12
2.6.3 Dependent variables
I used two operationalizations for the dependent variables. I first analyzed hazardous
emissions and pollution mitigation by weighting chemicals according to their cumulative impacts
on human health using the Chronic Human Health Indicator (CHHI). The CHHI constitutes a
chemical toxicity-weighting mechanism within the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) model (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
2012b) that provides different weights to chemicals based upon human exposure pathways,
because the same chemical can have a differential impact depending upon whether it is inhaled
or absorbed through contact or consumption (Toffel & Marshall, 2004). I then used a finergrained operationalization that weights chemicals with the Tool for the Reduction and
Assessment of Chemical and other environmental Impacts (TRACI). TRACI is a newer EPAsponsored measure that acknowledges differences for each exposure pathway depending upon

10

Many of the demographic fields in the NPRI are optional, and Environment Canada does not vet optional
information. Propensity score algorithms cannot consider records with missing data, so I included all observable,
mandatory, vetted, and relevant fields in the analysis.
11

Production volume and financial indicators represent two unobservable factors that could introduce bias into
estimates if JVs and independent firms systematically differ on these criteria. Prior studies on hazardous emissions
typically used the number of employees as a rough proxy for production (Antweiler & Harrison, 2003), and JVs are
not required to provide financial information to the public.
12

The mean propensity score difference between the 303 JV facility year observations and their matches was .0020
with a standard deviation of .0078.
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whether a given chemical has cancerous or non-cancerous human health impacts. The measure
utilizes disability-adjusted life years to consider decreased life expectancy and the years lived
with disability standardized by discount weights to capture unfavourable health conditions (Bare
et al., 2003).
I calculated hazardous byproducts with the equation
∑

,

(1)

hazardous emissions with the equation
∑

,

(2)

and pollution mitigation with the equation
∑
where

,

(3)

represents the total tonnage of chemical c recycled that would typically affect humans

through exposure pathway e in year t for facility f, and

equals the hazardous weight provided

by scale s (CHHI vs. Traci) for chemical c for exposure pathway e.
and without treatment),

represents disposals (with

represents emissions, and τ represents the total hazardous byproducts

disposed of after treatment. I take the log transformations of these measures to correct for
skewness and kurtosis.
2.6.4 Independent variables
I operationalized the JV indicator (JV) as 1 for joint ventures and as 0 for independent
facilities, which allowed me to examine the effect of co-ownership on hazardous emissions and
pollution mitigation. I operationalized the joint-and-several indicator (J&S) as 1 for joint-andseveral political jurisdictions and as 0 otherwise, because more legal stringency in the form of
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potentially disproportionate liability may influence co-owned facilities corporate response to
hazardous waste. The empirical setting (Canada) contains three distinct legal liability regimes
that vary in stringency. Most Canadian firms operate under the most stringent joint-and-several
legal liability regime. However, Saskatchewan firms operate under a pure proportional liability
regime, while British Columbian firms operate under a hybrid joint-and-several/proportional
liability regime. I coded both Saskatchewan and British Columbian facilities as 0, since there
were not enough Saskatchewan observations to allow a separate analysis of that province’s lessstringent legal liability regimes.13
2.6.5 Control variables
Since my population of interest (i.e., co-owned facilities) was stratified within the
numerous dimensions used to match co-owned facilities with similar independently owned
facilities, I used each matching criterion as a control within the regression equations (Ho et al.,
2007; Villalonga, 2004; Friedlander & Robins, 1995). Following prior NPRI (Harrison &
Antweiler, 2003; Antweiler & Harrison, 2003) and TRI studies, (Berchicci et al., 2012; King &
Lenox, 2001; King & Shaver, 2001), I used facility size (FacilitySize), operationalized by the
number of facility employees, as a crude measure of production, because I expected larger
facilities to pollute more. I also controlled for the number of chemicals (NumberofChemicals)
and the volume, or raw tonnage, of hazardous waste (HazardousByproducts) reported by each
facility because I expected facilities emitting a larger number and volume of chemicals to
differentially anticipate (Hart, 1995), monitor (Russo & Fouts, 1997), report (Sharma &
Vrendenburg, 1998; Shrivastava, 1995), and abate (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2011) their
emissions.

13

Excluding Saskatchewan facilities altogether does not alter the findings in the analysis.
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I also controlled for three additional aspects of ownership that can influence
environmental outcomes. First, approximately 23% of the facilities had at least one foreign
owner. I controlled for the percentage of foreign ownership (ForeignOwnership) because prior
studies argue that foreign-owned firms pollute more (King & Shaver, 2001) and may be judged
more harshly for doing so (Lange & Washburn, 2012). Second, I controlled for the percentage of
ownership represented by firms listed on the S&P 500 and S&P TSX Composite Index (S&P) in
case additional visibility and/or equity market scrutiny influences environmental performance14
(Lee, 2009; Villalonga, 2004). Finally, firms with multiple facilities may face stronger pressures
for shared responsibility and/or take advantage of peer-to-peer learning in pollution prevention
and abatement. I therefore controlled for the number of Canadian-based, NPRI-reporting peer
facilities owned and operated by the same parent(s) (PeerFacilities).
2.6.6 Analysis
I used standard OLS pooled regression and clustered the error terms by facility to account
for potential correlation in the error term attributable to the same facility reporting across time
(Rodgers, 1993). I included year fixed-effects (Year) to account for annual trends in pollution
abatement technologies, industry fixed-effects at the three-digit SIC level (Industry) to control
for idiosyncratic differences that vary across industries, and provincial fixed-effects (Province)
to account for any cultural and regulatory differences attributable to regional jurisdictions. My
baseline regression equation was:

14

The percentage of foreign ownership and the percentage of ownership listed on S&P indexes were excluded from
the matching algorithm because independently owned facilities would either be 100% or 0% in both of these
indicators.
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Overall, the baseline model accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in the
data, ranging from 40 to 63 percent depending upon the dependent variable observed. The
independent variables accounted for up to 3.1% of the statistical significance in the model
depending upon the dependent variable examined.15 As expected, context (industry and
province) and scale (facility size, number of chemicals reported, and hazardous waste volume)
accounted for the vast majority of variance in the data. While the models’ statistical significance
attributable to the independent variables appears small, the more important question is whether
the substantive significance of the findings is meaningful (Miller, 2008; Weisberg. 2004). The
results below demonstrate that co-ownership, overall, significantly and substantially influences
hazardous emissions and pollution mitigation for substances known to detrimentally impact
human health.
Correlations between the independent variables were moderate, but multicollinearity did
not appear to affect the results. The largest variance inflation factor (VIF) for the JV predictor
was 1.49, and the largest VIF for remaining variables was J&S at 5.66, well below the threshold
value of 10 (Kennedy, 1997; Neter et al., 1996), indicating that multicollinearity did not affect
the results. While all coefficients’ corresponding p-values were significant at an alpha level of
15

The independent variables independent accounting for variance in the data was examined by running the models
without control variables.
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0.05 in the main analysis, I indicate a more liberal level of significance at an alpha of 0.1 since a
type II error, that is the failure to reject the false null hypothesis, would fail to identify outcomes
that potentially impact human health. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the matchedpair sample along with pair-wise correlations among variables in the analysis.
2.7 RESULTS
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the analysis. Hypothesis 1 predicted that, ceteris
paribus, JV facilities would produce more hazardous byproducts because they struggle to align
their collective interests to agree upon and implement pollution prevention measures that require
long-term investments with uncertain and hard-to-allocate returns. As shown in column 1 of
Table 3, the coefficient for the JV predictor was negative and statistically non-significant,
indicating that co-owned facilities do not produce more hazardous byproducts than the matched
control of single-owned facilities. I further verified that this matched control sample was
representative of the larger population of single-owned facilities using ANOVA.16 The f-statistic
of 1.84 (p=0.175) confirmed that the control subsample did not significantly differ from the
population of independently owned facilities. Thus, H1 was rejected: JV facilities do not
automatically produce more byproducts than do comparable single-owned facilities.
Hypothesis 2A predicted that JV facilities would emit more hazardous waste compared to
their independently owned peers, because JVs favour economic trade-offs and are less likely to
take environmental trade-offs into consideration when deciding how to deal with their hazardous
byproducts. The results indicated that, compared to their independent cohorts, co-owned

16

Not displayed for parsimony. I used frequency weights to account for the same independent facility observation
serving as a match for multiple JV facility observations, and I restricted the ANOVA to those industries included in
the match-pair sample.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations
Mean
SD
1
Volume Haz. Byproducts
1,182,578 7,726,940
2
Hazardous emissions
367,867 1,255,587
3
Mitigation
95,429
432,635
4
Non-Cancerous Emissions
159,398
706,154
5
Cancerous Emissions
53.80
461
6
Non- Cancerous Mitigation
13,587
111,301
7
Cancerous Mitigation
42.54
420
8
JV
0.50
0.50
9
J&S
0.86
0.34
10 Facility size
888
2,142
11 Peer facilities
5.39
16.43
12 Foreign ownership
15.60
32.20
13 S&P Constituency
16.29
30.96
14 Number of Chemicals
13.98
11.72

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1

Max
158,000,000
24,100,000
5,337,714
6,968,236
9,440
1,934,868
4,791
1
1
11,252
121
100
100
58

1
1
0.2207
0.0664
0.0980
0.0229
0.0823
0.0108
0.0452
0.0054
0.0731
-0.0307
-0.0615
0.0236
0.1759

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1
0.0877
0.2328
0.0181
0.0292
-0.0060
-0.0533
-0.0774
0.1724
-0.0131
-0.0873
-0.0296
0.2460

1
0.0442
0.1673
0.0359
0.1365
-0.1802
0.0771
0.1898
-0.0484
-0.0730
-0.0952
0.1852

1
0.0489
-0.0154
0.0307
0.1086
-0.2799
-0.0180
-0.0340
-0.0581
-0.0315
0.2242

1
0.0129
0.6370
-0.0920
0.0370
0.2392
-0.0298
-0.0508
-0.0339
0.3318

1
-0.0116
-0.0009
0.0174
0.0615
-0.0274
-0.0506
0.1168
0.1815

1
-0.1011
0.0401
0.1976
-0.0177
-0.0491
-0.0532
0.3642

1
0.0000
-0.2014
-0.0382
0.2319
0.2767
-0.0833

1
0.1155
-0.0822
0.0944
-0.0341
-0.1210

9
10
11
12
13
14
9
J&S
1
10 Facility size
0.1118 1
11 Peer facilities
-0.0636 -0.0909 1
12 Foreign ownership
0.0609 -0.0830
0.0091 1
13 S&P Constituency
-0.0154 -0.1066 -0.0931 -0.0421 1
14 Number of Chemicals -0.1106
0.2235
0.0518 -0.1972 -0.0120 1
Note: n = 606. The minimum reported total toxic emissions exceeds zero, but rounds to zero. Correlations (absolute value) greater than 0.0796 (0.1045) are significant
at the 5% (1%) level.
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Table 3: The relationship between co-ownership and pollutants weighted by their general human health impacts
Hypotheses 1
Hazardous
Byproducts

JV

Hazardous
Byproducts

Hypothesis 2A
Emissions

- 1.2291
(4.6471)

Emissions

0.5544
(0.2901)

Mitigation

***

Hypothesis 2B

Hypothesis 3A

Hypothesis 3B

Mitigation

Emissions

Mitigation

- 0.9240
(1.7547)

JV*J&S
J&S

3.2241
(11.2731)

3.1718
(11.3192)
****

**

1.9713
(1.1108)

***

- 1.5904
(7.1841)

0.5805
(0.1039)

****

0.4875
(0.1627)

****

2.2617
(0.9014)

***

0.4875
(0.1627)

***

0.1019
(1.1262)

Ln(Facility Size)

7.1286
(1.8921)

Ln(Peer Facilities)

2.1536
(2.3725)

2.0613
(2.3351)

0.4461
(0.1725)

Ln(Foreign Ownership)

0.1564
(0.2662)

0.1752
(0.2812)

0.0041
(0.0162)

- 0.0044
(0.0163)

Ln(S&P Constituent)

- 0.0315
(0.1060)

- 0.0256
(0.1041)

0.0054
(0.0049)

0.0027
(0.0048)

Ln(No. Chemicals)

17.9299
(4.8048)

****

7.1060
(1.9129)

1.9481
(1.1570)

17.8468
(4.7838)

Ln(Haz. Byproducts)
Province Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Adjusted
Δ
Facilities
n

****

****

- 1.6291
(7.1133)

- 3.0438
(7.2197)

1.3494
(1.1844)

3.1862
(4.0871)
2.2581
(0.8911)

0.0329
(1.1243)

0.5087
(0.1680)

***

0.0810
(1.0737)

0.0923
(0.0854)

0.1065
(0.0854)

-0.0078
(0.0160)

0.0986
(0.0877)

- 0.0220
(0.0307)

- 0.0175
(0.0295)

0.0014
(0.0048)

- 0.0204
(0.0294)

1.7711
(0.2592)

****

3.2728
(1.3789)

0.0214
(0.0044)

****

0.0215
(0.0043)

***

0.0058
(0.0220)

***

3.2138
(1.3945)

***

1.4007
(1.0920)

****

****

2.2460
(0.8849)

- 3.5532
(3.7094)

0.5952
(0.0965)

1.7357
(0.2702)

***

-0.6014
(1.0286)

***

1.7547
(0.2603)

****

3.1765
(1.3953)

0.0056
(0.0220)

0.0211
(0.0043)

****

0.0046
(0.0223)

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

0.5111

0.5103
0.0008
249
606

0.7319

0.7347
0.0028
249
606

0.4898

0.4896
0.0002
249
606

0.7369
0.0050
249
606

0.4896
0.0002
249
606

249
606

249
606

p<.001 = ****; p<.01 = ***; p<.05 = **; p<.1 = *, one-tailed
Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parenthesis
Chemicals in hypotheses 1 to 3 are weighted using the Chronic Human Health Indicator
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249
606

***

***

facilities emit approximately 74% more hazardous emissions,17 lending support for hypothesis
2A. Net of the volume of hazardous waste resulting from each facility’s production process
(H1),co-ownership was shown to have significant and substantial effects on facilities’ emissions.
Counter to Hypothesis 2B, I found no evidence that JVs and independently owned
facilities differ in hazardous byproducts mitigation. While the coefficient for JV facilities is large
and negative, it is statistically non-significant. This result was somewhat surprising in light of
JVs’ hazardous emissions. I considered the possibility that JVs mitigate similar amounts of
hazardous waste because recycling and treatment technologies may not exist for some chemical
byproducts, since King & Shaver (2001) suggest that foreign-owned facilities may produce
unique and unfamiliar chemical compounds that prevent mitigation. Unlike King & Shaver,
however, I found no evidence of a relationship between foreignness and hazardous waste
processing,18 and every chemical reported by facilities in the sample had been recycled or treated
by firms prior to 2003. Thus, all emitted chemicals in the sample could have been treated or
recycled, but facilities chose to emit nonetheless.
One potential explanation for this non-finding is that most facilities – JVs and
independent alike – appeared to do little in terms of pollution mitigation. Over the six-year
sample, facilities treated or recycled only 12.64% of all hazardous waste that could have been
treated or recycled.19 Perhaps facilities minimize pollution mitigation to the bare minimum
allowed by laws or regulation. An alternative explanation is that all facilities employ at least

17

The percentage difference for JV facilities is determined by examining the exponentiated coefficient of the JV
indicator variable: exp(
= exp(0.5544) – 1 = 1.74
18
King & Shaver (2001) did not examine JV facilities in their study, and they weighted chemical hazards by an
older method that is no longer utilized (i.e. the inverse of reportable quantity threshold), providing two potential
explanations for the different findings.
19

Based upon hazardous waste reported to the NPRI by all facilities, prior to weighting the level of hazard.
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some half-hearted pollution mitigation measures, perhaps to signal a requisite degree of concern
for environmental externalities.
In hypotheses 3A and 3B, I predicted that, compared to all other facilities, co-owned
facilities in pure joint-and-several regimes would emit less and mitigate more hazardous waste
since stricter liability regimes increase the enforceability of social expectations through
potentially disproportionate penalties. Counter to my predictions, I found no evidence that JV
facilities in stricter liability regimes differ from other facilities in hazardous emissions or
pollution mitigation; I therefore reject hypotheses 3A and 3B.
One potential explanation for these results might be that they stem from unobservable
cultural differences within political jurisdictions in the sample. Eighty-seven percent of my
observations for non-joint-and-several regimes derived from British Columbia, where
environmental landscapes represent a great source of pride and concern for the region’s
population (Willems-Braun, 1997). This heightened awareness of environmental issues could
influence decision-makers embedded within the regional culture and provide additional
incentives for facilities to address environmental externalities, thus eliminating the legal liability
influence that would typically be observed.
Another potential explanation is that disproportionate liability manifests only in cases of
undercapitalization, insolvency, or negligence (Grady, 1990). It is possible that co-owners of
struggling or undercapitalized JVs in stricter regimes pay closer attention to environmental
externalities or that co-ownership reduces the likelihood of negligent emissions. However, the
data cannot differentiate facilities along these dimensions. The self-reported (and sometimes
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audited) and publicly available government information simply speaks to more typical decisions
and behaviours20 that may not activate the legal liability regime.
As shown in Table 4, I next examined the extent to which co-owners attend to cancerous
byproducts (H4A and H4B) and neglect non-cancerous byproducts (H5A and H5B). Supporting
null-hypotheses 4A and 4B, I found no difference between JV and independent firms in their
emissions and mitigation of cancerous byproducts. JV and independently owned facilities emit
(H4A) and mitigate (H4B) similar amounts of cancerous waste. A power analysis, including a
sample size of 606, a minimum observed

of 0.3979, 58 predictors, and a type-one error rate of

.001, revealed that hypotheses 4A and 4B provided a statistical power equal to one, indicating
that there was more than sufficient statistical power to support these null hypotheses. In support
of hypothesis 5A, I found that co-owned facilities emitted approximately 158% more noncancerous hazardous waste. However, I found no evidence that they mitigate less non-cancerous
waste, which led me to reject hypothesis 5B.
While I expected co-owned facilities to emit more non-cancerous byproducts, I was
surprised to discover how much more co-owned facilities emit. I therefore ran a robustness check
to ensure that the statistical significance and magnitude of the results remained robust to the
weighting mechanism used to capture cancerous and non- cancerous externalities. I replaced
TRACI’s weighting mechanism with the Environmental Defense Funds Toxicity Equivalent
Potential Scorecard (TEPS), Environment Canada’s preferred hazardous weighting mechanism.

20

I assume that a large majority of emissions in the data fell within acceptable thresholds established by existing
laws and regulations since firms provide self-reported emissions data to the government and general public.
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Table 4: The relationship between co-ownership and pollutants weighted by their cancerous and non-cancerous human health impacts
Hypothesis 4A
Hypothesis 4B
Hypothesis 5A
Cancerous
Emissions

JV

Cancerous
Emissions

Cancerous
Pollution
Mitigation

Cancerous
Pollution
Mitigation

- 0.1780
(0.2157)

J&S

0.6597
(0.7753)

Ln(Facility Size)

0.3799
(0.0850)

Ln(Peer Facilities)

- 0.0855
(0.1232)

Ln(Foreign Ownership)

- 0.0132
(0.0084)

S&P Constituent

0.0014
(0.0030)

Ln(No. Chemicals)

0.6119
(0.1684)

****

0.5996
(0.1709)

ln(Cancerous Byproducts)

0.0188
(0.0058)

****

0.0186
(0.0058)

- 0.8702
(0.8987)

0.6536
(0.7925)
****

*

0.3770
(0.0834)

****

Adjusted
Δ
Facilities
n

Non-Cancerous
Emissions

0.9497
(0.4640)

Hypothesis 5B

Non-Cancerous
Pollution
Mitigation

***

*

- 3.7435
(2.5629)

*

- 1.2695
(1.2772)

- 1.2286
(1.2676)

- 1.6794
(6.6239)

1.4719
(0.5105)

***

1.4574
(0.4919)

***

0.0925
(0.2532)

0.1107
(0.2522)

1.7082
(0.6771)

- 0.0983
(0.1321)

0.6942
(0.7196)

0.6314
(0.6992)

0.4225
(0.2704)

*

0.4939
(0.2637)

- 0.0104
(0.0086)

- 0.0369
(0.0486)

- 0.0235
(0.0497)

0.0155
(0.0187)

*

0.0011
(0.0209)

0.0829
(0.0685)

0.0022
(0.0031)

- 0.0325
(0.0145)

**

- 0.0283
(0.0144)

***

0.0084
(0.0100)

0.0037
(0.0090)

- 0.0139
(0.0273)

****

1.3457
(0.8470)

*

1.2856
(0.8601)

*

2.8842
(0.3873)

***

0.0245
(0.0267)

****

***

Non-Cancerous
Pollution
Mitigation

- 0.1714
(1.4775)

- 3.7137
(2.6475)

- 1.6868
(6.6191)
***

- 0.0492
(0.8710)

1.7049
(0.6742)

**

0.0855
(0.0718)
- 0.0131
(0.0252)

2.9510
(0.3775)

****

4.3769
(1.1344)

****

4.3648
(1.1532)

0.0470
(0.0109)

0.0465
(0.2637)

****

0.0190
(0.0312)

0.0191
(0.0309)

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

0.5583

0.5595
0.0012
249
606

0.3979

0.3993
0.0014
249
606

0.5978

0.6045
0.0067
249
606

0.4800

0.4791
0.0009
249
606

249
606

249
606

249
606

249
606

p<.001 = ****; p<.01 = ***; p<.05 = **; p<.1 = *, one-tailed
Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parenthesis

Chemicals in hypotheses 4 and 5 are weighted using the Tool for the Reduction and Assessment of Chemical and other environmental Impacts (TRACI)
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***

0.0364
(0.8814)

0.0234
(0.0265)

ln(Non-cancerous Byproducts)

Province Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

Non-Cancerous
Emissions

****

The TEPS, like TRACI, provides hazardous weights for chemicals based upon lifecycles
assessments and exposure pathways and provides separate weights for cancerous and noncancerous impacts.21 Using the TEPS weights provided by Environment Canada, I reweighted
chemical hazards and reran the regressions for hypotheses 4 and 5. The TEPS weighted sample
and robustness regressions in Table 5 replicate the main findings and indicate that JV facilities
emit approximately 134% more non-cancerous substances (H5A), emit similar amounts of
cancerous byproducts (H4A), and mitigate a similar amount of their cancerous (H4B) and noncancerous (H5B) byproducts.
In summary, the results of the analysis showed that divided ownership contributes to
negative externalities that have an impact on human health. A summary of hypothesized effects
along with the analysis findings is provided in Table 6. The results reinforce the assertion that we
are not merely witnessing a difference between two sets of facilities but rather a systematic way
in which co-owned facilities emit more. Clearly, multiple owners can agree and act jointly just as
effectively as single owners do to mitigate the unambiguous harm attributable to cancerous
chemicals. At the same time, co-ownership systematically desensitizes facilities to legal liability
regimes, environmental trade-offs, and ambiguous environmental categories such as noncancerous chemicals. Differentiating between cancerous and non-cancerous impacts allowed me
to uncover variance between JV and independent facilities that could not have otherwise been
explained. This differentiation also allowed me to distinguish among different mechanisms
through which co-ownership may systematically hinder environmental performance.

21

While TEPs and TRACI examine a similar number of chemicals (356 vs. 345), TEPs examines 19 chemicals not
listed in TRACI and TRACI examines 30 chemicals not listed in TEPs, providing an overlap of 86.9%.
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Table 5: Robustness checks examining co-ownership and cancerous and non-cancerous human health impacts
Hypothesis 4A
Cancerous
Emissions

JV

Cancerous
Emissions

Hypothesis 4B
Cancerous
Pollution
Mitigation

Cancerous
Pollution
Mitigation

- 0.1780
(0.2157)

J&S

0.6597
(0.7753)

Ln(Facility Size)

0.3799
(0.0850)

Ln(Peer Facilities)

- 0.0855
(0.1232)

Ln(Foreign Ownership)

- 0.0132
(0.0084)

S&P Constituent

0.0014
(0.0030)

Ln(No. Chemicals)

0.6119
(0.1684)

****

0.5996
(0.1709)

ln(Cancerous Byproducts)

0.0188
(0.0058)

****

0.0186
(0.0058)

*

0.3770
(0.0834)

****

Adjusted
Δ
Facilities
n

Non-Cancerous
Emissions

0.9497
(0.4640)

Hypothesis 5B
Non-Cancerous
Pollution
Mitigation

***

*

- 3.7435
(2.5629)

*

- 1.2695
(1.2772)

- 1.2286
(1.2676)

- 1.6794
(6.6239)

1.4719
(0.5105)

***

1.4574
(0.4919)

***

0.0925
(0.2532)

0.1107
(0.2522)

1.7082
(0.6771)

- 0.0983
(0.1321)

0.6942
(0.7196)

0.6314
(0.6992)

0.4225
(0.2704)

*

0.4939
(0.2637)

- 0.0104
(0.0086)

- 0.0369
(0.0486)

- 0.0235
(0.0497)

0.0155
(0.0187)

*

0.0011
(0.0209)

0.0829
(0.0685)

0.0022
(0.0031)

- 0.0325
(0.0145)

**

- 0.0283
(0.0144)

***

0.0084
(0.0100)

0.0037
(0.0090)

- 0.0139
(0.0273)

****

1.3457
(0.8470)

*

1.2856
(0.8601)

*

2.8842
(0.3873)

***

0.0245
(0.0267)

****

***

Non-Cancerous
Pollution
Mitigation

- 0.1714
(1.4775)

- 3.7137
(2.6475)

- 1.6868
(6.6191)
***

- 0.0492
(0.8710)

1.7049
(0.6742)

**

0.0855
(0.0718)
- 0.0131
(0.0252)

2.9510
(0.3775)

****

4.3769
(1.1344)

****

4.3648
(1.1532)

0.0470
(0.0109)

0.0465
(0.2637)

****

0.0190
(0.0312)

0.0191
(0.0309)

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

0.5583

0.5595
0.0012
249
606

0.3979

0.3993
0.0014
249
606

0.5978

0.6045
0.0067
249
606

0.4800

0.4791
0.0009
249
606

249
606

249
606

p<.001 = ****; p<.01 = ***; p<.05 = **; p<.1 = *, one-tailed
Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parenthesis

Chemicals in the robustness checks are weighted using the Toxicity Equivalent Potential Scorecard (TEPS)
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249
606

249
606

***

0.0364
(0.8814)

0.0234
(0.0265)

ln(Non-cancerous Byproducts)

Province Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

Non-Cancerous
Emissions

- 0.8702
(0.8987)

0.6536
(0.7925)
****

Hypothesis 5A

****

Table 6: Summary of hypothesized effects and analysis findings

Hypothesis
H1:

Finding

JV facilities produce more hazardous byproducts than do singleowned facilities.

H2A: JV facilities emit more hazardous byproducts than do single-owned
facilities.

Not supported
Supported

H2B: JV facilities mitigate less hazardous byproducts than do singleowned facilities.

Not supported

H3A: JV facilities in joint-and-several liability regimes emit less hazardous
byproducts than do all other facilities.

Not supported

H3B: JV facilities in joint-and-several regimes mitigate more hazardous
byproducts than do all other facilities.

Not supported

H4A: There is no difference between JV and single owned facilities in the
emission of cancerous byproducts.

Supported

H4B: There is no difference between JV and single owned facilities in the
mitigation of cancerous byproducts

Supported

H5A: JV facilities emit more noncancerous hazardous byproducts than
do single owned facilities.

Supported

H5B: JV facilities mitigate less noncancerous hazardous byproducts than
do single-owned facilities
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Not supported

2.8 DISCUSSION
This study highlights the previously under-theorized role of divided ownership in
whether and how facilities address hazardous byproducts. I argued and showed that co-owners
can be as sensitive as single owners to consensual issues, such as preventing exposure to
cancerous byproducts. However, in the face of ambiguous categories of harm (i.e. non-cancerous
hazards), co-owners were shown to be predictably and systematically less responsible than single
owners. Simply put, co-owners predictably fail to address issues of social relevance because it
takes more effort to reconcile multiple corporate interests (Mahoney, 2005; Beamish & Inkpen,
1995; Killing, 1983) in pursuits of the common good.
Theoretically, this study suggests that divisions in ownership can influence how coowned facilities see and negotiate the interface between business and society. Co-owners can
overcome differences in goals and co-ordination challenges to move towards the greater good,
but they predictably and rationally choose not to. These arguments resonate with environmental
psychology arguments and advance a multiplicity trap. Specifically, I argued and showed that the
mere presence of multiple owners can fundamentally alter whether and how facilities address
pressing environmental issues.
The sustainability literature has grown beyond organizational studies that have examined
operations and technologies. There has been sustained interest across disciplines in efforts to
control, abate, and/or divert hazardous byproducts before they have adverse effects on human
health (Wilson, Chia, & Ehlers, 2006; Fullerton, 2006; Burby & Strong, 1997; Johnson, 1997;
Landrigan & Carlson, 1995; Baker & Markoff, 1986; Arbuckle et al., 1976). My findings are
complementary to prior evidence that emphasizes the necessity and validity of internal drivers,
even in the absence or the divergence of external inducements (Branzei et al., 2004). By
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including ownership as an important internal driver, and by showing how resilient it can be to
environmental trade-offs and constraints (but not categories), I add new momentum to the
question of what else differentiates firms’ environmental performance.
2.8.1 Limitations and future research opportunities
There are several limitations to the study that provide opportunities for future researchers
to build upon my findings. First, I examined only two aspects of facility level environmental
performance – emissions and pollution mitigation. JVs can leverage the best practices of multiple
firms, which could lead to improvements in energy consumption, product cradle-to-grave
impacts, or natural resource utilization. Further, JVs create the opportunity for knowledge and
technology transfers (Spender & Grant, 1996; Kogut, 1988) that could improve parent firms’
environmental performance in ways not observed in this study. Thus, the relationship between
divided ownership and other dimensions of environmental performance deserves future analysis.
Second, the data in my study did not allow controlling for production directly, as in other
studies examining hazardous byproducts (Berchicci et al., 2012; Berrone et al., 2010; Antweiler
& Harrison, 2003; King & Lenox, 2001; King & Shaver, 2001). While I controlled for the
volume of hazardous waste created in the production life-cycle, it remains possible that JV
facilities produce differently. For example, JV partners may take extra precautions, introduce
different technologies, or pool and transfer capabilities across different partners. Some of the
mechanisms by which co-ownership anticipates harm could not be tested in this study, but they
are worthy of future queries. Co-ownership can be a force for good, and new literature is
currently addressing whether and when divisions are generative and may even tackle intractable
environmental challenges (Branzei & Le Ber, 2013).
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Third, JV scholars indicate that different divisions of equity among JV partners influence
the balance of power between corporate owners, the extent to which partners accommodate one
another in decision making (Blodgett, 1992; Beamish & Banks, 1987), and the stability of the JV
itself (Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002; Lee & Beamish, 1995; Beamish 1993, 1985). In JVs with
unequal ownership, the majority parent may have more leverage to influence decisions than
minority partners. In dual ownership JVs (50-50 equity sharing), however, extensive
conversations and/or negotiations are often required to reach a decision (Park & Ungson, 1997).
Thus, different configurations of JV equity ownership could influence co-owners ability to agree
upon and implement collective action for addressing hazardous externalities within their
facilities.
More research is also required to determine the exact mechanisms by which divided
ownership influences environmental outcomes. An important premise of my theoretical
framework is that the greater difficulty of co-ordinating multiple economic interests gets in the
way of environmental interests. Aligning divergent interests should become increasingly difficult
with more heterogeneous partners and more balanced equity shares. JVs with a strong majority
owner may behave more like independent firms than like other JVs with equal, or nearly equal,
owners.
My inferences relied on publicly accessible data, and I presumed that owners had access
to such data. This presumption was particularly strong when I discussed environmental
categories such as cancerous versus non-cancerous chemicals. Owners and other publics may
lack accurate and actionable intelligence regarding the dangers of emitted toxins. Environment
Canada and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency provide invaluable information on
hazardous waste processing and disposal, but I would argue that this information remains
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uninterpretable for the common citizen. The average person can easily ascribe meaning to
“cancer” and “non-cancer” but cannot easily differentiate the relative hazard between
nitrosodiphenylamine, cancerous yet relatively benign, and phenyl mercaptan, non-cancerous yet
highly toxic. Providing tools that allow the average person to ascribe accurate meaning to
publicly available data could prove very effective in encouraging firms to address more
hazardous externalities. Such tools may also improve owners’ ability to understand – and
therefore their willingness to heed – warning signals.
Finally, this study was set in a single industrialized country with a strong legal system
that protects social interests. I suspect that the results generalize to other industrialized countries
with similar characteristics, but exploring the influence of divided ownership on environmental
outcomes in the absence of these institutions or in the presence of different institutions deserves
future study. I also encourage replications of my analysis in additional countries containing jointand-several and proportional liability political jurisdictions to determine the extent to which the
results generalize to different contexts. It is possible that future scholars could find relationships
between legal liability stringency and environmental outcomes where I could not.
2.8.2 Practical implications
The results of the analysis provide some interesting practical implications for policymakers and environmental agencies. First and foremost, they show how co-ownership
substantially increases the hazardous chemicals produced and systematically causes JV facilities
to emit more than their single-owned peers. While these effects may be disheartening to some, an
important silver lining emerges: alerting co-owned facilities to the differences found may inspire
greater attention to the co-ordination challenges discussed here. Going one step further,
implementing differential audits, or even systems of incentives and regulations that provide more
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stringent scrutiny to co-owned facilities, may achieve important environmental improvements.
Because co-owners can and do effectively mitigate unambiguous harm, even simple
communication strategies that emphasize the harmful effects of specific chemicals can direct
attention and motivate action that benefits, rather than hurts, society.
Further, policy-makers and environmental agencies should place additional emphasis on
regulating hazardous non-cancerous substances, an act that would decrease ambiguity and leave
less room for debate or delay among co-owners. Tightening regulation around less-common or
less-understood, non-cancerous hazards would complement the motivational power of informal
societal pressures towards cancerous substances, thus reducing overall environmental hazards.

2.9 CONCLUSION
The key conceptual and empirical contribution of this study lies in showing how and
explaining why divided ownership shapes the way facilities deal with hazardous byproducts. I
find that single and multiple owners can and do address environmental externalities when
environmental categories are unambiguous (i.e., cancerous chemicals). However, co-ownership
significantly and substantially downplays environmental trade-offs when categories are
ambiguous (i.e., non-cancerous chemicals). Thus, divided ownership contextualizes hazardous
waste processing decisions and can hinder organizations’ willingness and/or ability to take
environmental concerns into account.
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Chapter 3:
JV Ownership Coalitions &
Environmental Performance

Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) created widespread awareness of the detrimental
consequences of industrial waste, not only to the natural environment but also to human health.
The last 50 years have seen marked improvements in legislation and regulation to protect the
public from hazardous industrial byproducts, and, increasingly, firms have worked to reduce
industrial pollution (Glicksman & Earnhart, 2007; Laplante & Rilstone, 1996; Magat & Viscusi,
1990) through advancements in technology (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005; Shrivastava, 1995),
processes (Porter & van der Linde, 1995), and capabilities (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2011; Russo
& Fouts, 1997). Despite these advancements, however, firms continue to release harmful
byproducts that have serious health consequences, and seemingly similar organizations still
exhibit a wide and persistent variance in environmental performance.
More recently, scholars have increasingly ascribed differences in environmental
performance to the systematic characteristics and preferences of different types of owners. These
studies suggest that certain types of firms are more or less likely than others to address hazardous
externalities due to their distinctive resources (Darnall & Edwards, 2006), inherent capabilities
(King & Shaver, 2001), influential stakeholders (Darnall, Henriguez, & Sadorsky, 2010; Lee,
2009), and valuation of environmental performance (Berrone et al., 2010; Sethi, 2003). While
these studies highlight when, why, and how different types of owners pursue environmental
sustainability, relatively little is known about how co-owners, each with a unique set of
organizational objectives, influence environmental performance within their joint venture (JV)
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subsidiaries. In this study, I ask “Does a JV’s ownership coalition affect its environmental
performance, and if so, how, when, and why?”
JV scholars hold two competing hypotheses concerning the effect of multiple owners on
traditional performance constructs. Some theorize and find an inverse relationship between the
number of partners associated with a venture and financial performance, arguing that additional
partners increase complexity and costs (van de Ven, 1976), create opportunities for free-riding
(Parkhe, 1993), intensify management problems (Beamish & Schaan, 1988) and increase the
likelihood of conflict from divergent interests (Parkhe, 1993; Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Even
good JV owners “can and will disagree on just about anything” (Beamish & Inkpen, 1995: 27),
but many tackle even the toughest co-ordination challenges when they set out to build additional
economic value (Das & Teng, 2000). Others claim and show that additional owners provide JVs
access to more resources that can increase performance (Hu & Chen, 1996) and survival (Park &
Russo, 1996). In some cases, the costs and benefits associated with additional owners effectively
offset one another (Beamish & Kachra, 2004).
Much less is known about the effect of multiple owners on social and/or environmental
performance. Both positive and negative effects are possible because co-ordination difficulties
can create additional opportunities for social value creation (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010; Ostrum,
2000; Ostrum, 1990), and successes can open up unprecedented opportunities to innovate and
grow more than competitors, especially when firms face challenging issues that require multiple
stakeholders and partners (Branzei & Le Ber, 2013). However, creating social value becomes
complicated by the economic costs incurred ex-ante, with unpredictable economic gains accruing
in the distant future (Slawinski, 2010; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001). Thus, when it comes to
voluntary social or environmental investments (i.e., where costs are certain and incurred upfront
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while economic benefits remain questionable and/or unclear), co-owners may be less inclined to
spend resources to overcome co-ordination challenges (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; King &
Lenox, 2002; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Elkington, 1998; Arora & Cason, 1995; Hart & Ahuja,
1996; Hirschhorn, 1994).
Individual firms’ characteristics and internal and external constituencies (Branzei et al.,
2004; Sharma, 2000) may further increase disparities among partners, with some bearing
disproportionately higher costs for social investments (Darnall & Edwards, 2006) and others
ascribing or reaping higher returns for social and/or environmentally minded activities (Margolis,
Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007). When we add the perceptual and attributional differences among
partners (Berrone et al., 2010; Lange & Washburn, 2012; Darnall et al., 2010; Henriguez &
Sadorsky, 1999) to the real differences in the economic costs and benefits associated with steps
taken by each partner, the shared search and struggle for finding overlapping interests for
socially beneficial investments is not only less likely to happen but also harder to complete or
sustain.
My premise is that co-ownership influences JVs’ environmental performance through
three distinct mechanisms. First, I hypothesize that greater numbers of owners exacerbate the coordination problems stemming from real and perceptual costs and benefits, and therefore
negatively affect environmental performance. Second, I explain that heterogeneous partners can
surface and balance heterogeneous preferences that include specific environmental issues, and
may therefore unilaterally or disproportionately improve common environmental performance
for these specific issues. Third, I explain that when categories of partners – that is, partners
representing different types of ownership – (de)emphasize specific environmental issues, the
environmental performance of a co-owned facility adjusts accordingly.
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3.1 THEORY & HYPOTHESES
Several theoretical accounts explain why firms undertake voluntary social investments,
and these proclivities lie upon a continuum polarized by profit-seeking and moral duty (van de
Ven & Jeurissen, 2005; Scalise, 2005; Cox & Hazen, 2003). While profit seeking and moral duty
are not necessarily mutually exclusive motivations, normative accounts suggest that managers
pursue social investments because it is the moral thing to do (Marcus & Fremeth, 2009) and
economic accounts suggest that managers pursue social investments when they pay off
financially (Reinhardt & Stavins, 2010; van de Ven & Jeurissen, 2005). Several meta-analyses
demonstrate that firms do consider the financial implications of environmental initiatives and are
more likely to undertake them when they “pay” (Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Reynes, 2003) or at least
quickly break even (Reinhardt & Stavins, 2010; Margolis et al., 2007). However, whether or not
an environmental investment pays depends upon how firms frame environmental issues and
account for value.
Margolis et al. (2007) highlight two distinct mechanisms linking social performance to
financial performance. The first mechanism views environmental initiatives as investments in a
distinctive resource that directly affects costs and/or complements other resources to help build
more value internally. For instance, studies suggest that environmental initiatives increase
resource efficiency (Porter & van der Linde, 1995), reduce risks (Flanigan, 2002; Shrivastava,
1995), eliminate hidden costs (King & Lenox, 2002), and strengthen manufacturing performance
(Klassen & Whybark, 1999). Scholars in this theoretical domain typically suggest that firms
pursue environmental initiatives that predictably increase firms’ profitability (Earnhardt & Lizal,
2006; van de Ven & Jeurissen, 2005).
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The second mechanism views environmental initiatives as tools for building value
indirectly through managing relationships with external stakeholders. In other words, morally
responsible actions can serve a firm’s self-interest, and firms can do better by doing good
(Margolis et al., 2007). These studies suggest that environmental performance generates
additional demand for a company’s products (Sprinkle & Maines, 2010; McWilliams, Siegel, &
Wright, 2006), builds goodwill (Margolis et al., 2007) and lowers the costs of capital (Sharfman
& Fernando, 2008; Aintablian, McGraw, & Roberts, 2007; Thompson & Cowton, 2004).
While profit-seeking theoretical accounts focus on the financial implications of socially
beneficial investments, they intentionally overlook firms that account for value accruing outside
the firm. Family owners, for instance, are known to derive non-economic utility from their firms’
moral actions (Barrone et al., 2010; Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Tagiuri & Davis, 2004; Schulze et
al., 2001; Dane et al., 1999), while government owners provide financial capital with the intent
that value will accrue to society (Darnell & Edwards, 2006; Downs & Larkey, 1986). Firms with
family and/or government owners also pursue profits, but, whereas profit-maximizing firms may
restrict investments to those that will ultimately provide calculable financial returns, familycontrolled firms (Schulze et al., 2001) and government agencies (Downs & Larkey, 1986) also
consider social investments with ambiguous financial returns that provide societal value.
When examining social investments, JV partners must not only manage different logics
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) but also different objectives (Killing, 1983) for social value creation
that could undermine their ability to collectively agree upon an appropriate course of action.
Chapter 2 demonstrates that co-ownership systematically influences environmental performance,
and prior research explains that going beyond one owner necessarily increases conflict and
complexity (Mahoney, 2005; Parkhe, 1993; Libecap, 1989; Barzel, 1989; Beamish & Schaan,
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1988; van de Ven, 1976; Cartwright & Zander, 1968), even in partnerships designed
purposefully and collaboratively (Branzei & Le Ber, 2013; Grudinschi et al., 2011). Different
owners serve distinct internal and external stakeholders (Darnall, Potoski, & Prakash, 2010;
Darnall, Soel, & Sarkis, 2009; Branzei et al., 2004; Sharma, 2000) and differ in their
environmental expectations, in their readiness to undertake initiatives, and in their ex-ante
sensitivity to environmental costs and benefits (Earnhardt & Lizal, 2006). Further, they follow
different methods to evaluate and monetize any penalties or gains that accrue from
environmental initiatives (Margolis et al., 2003). Getting to “maybe” is hard work (Westley,
Zimmerman, & Patton, 2006), and common ground is never a foregone conclusion (Killing,
1983; Mahoney, 2005; Barzel, 1997; Beamish & Inkpen, 1995; Libecap, 1989).
Scholars also suggest that some environmental initiatives provide more internal value
than others. I focus on JVs’ pollution mitigation of hazardous byproducts – namely, recycling
and treatment prior to disposal – for two primary reasons. First, unlike pollution prevention
measures that eliminate byproducts before they occur, pollution mitigation measures typically
increase costs without providing additional strategic or financial advantage (King & Lenox,
2002; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001; Porter & van der Linde, 1995). Thus, increased pollution
mitigation should more closely align with a moral-duty tendencies, while refraining from
pollution mitigation should align with a profit-maximization tendencies. In contrast, the
motivations for pursuing or not pursuing pollution prevention, which affects emissions, remain
unclear and could easily align with both perspectives. Second, scholars suggest that larger firms
may inherently emit more as a result of higher production levels (Antweiler & Harrison, 2003;
Harrison & Antweiler, 2003) and thus may have less control over emissions. However, through
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pollution mitigation, all firms that produce hazardous waste can choose the extent to which they
address their environmental impacts.22
I examine specific distributional characteristics of co-ownership to argue that who works
together predictably shapes JVs’ pollution mitigation. I theorize that JV co-ownership, in
general, exposes the often-hidden tension between profit-maximizing and moral-duty tendencies,
and I theorize and test how the balance between these tendencies shifts, depending upon 1)
ownership dispersion – the number of JV partners and their respective balance of ownership
within the coalition, 2) the type of firms participating in the coalition, and 3) coalition
heterogeneity – the balance in equity between the different types of owners in the coalition.
3.2 OWNERSHIP DISPERSION
Ownership dispersion represents a key distributional characteristic of ownership,
specifically, how finely the equity invested in a specific facility is spread across multiple
partners. Co-owned facilities range from low dispersion (few partners with uneven equity stakes)
to high dispersion (many partners with even equity shares).23 The mechanism by which
ownership dispersion influences JVs is its moderation of complexity (van de Ven, 1976) and coordination difficulties (Parkhe, 1993; Cartwright & Zander, 1968), which can manifest as
conflict, decision delays, or increased costs (Barzel, 1997; Libecap, 1989; Demsetz, 1967).
Whatever the issue, partners who differ in their priorities naturally struggle to align multiple, and
oftentimes conflicting, goals (Killing, 1983). These coordination difficulties are likely to be

22

Every chemical reported by JV facilities in my sampling frame has been reported as treated or recycled at some
point between 1994 and 2003, thus eliminating concerns that technology may not exist to abate certain chemical
hazards.
23

Drawing upon Killing’s (1983) definition of equity joint ventures for this study, , the lowest dispersion represents
a JV with an equity distribution of 95/5, and the highest dispersion arises from an eight-partner JV with an equity
distribution of 32/25/12/9/7/5/5/5.
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magnified for environmental issues, which are deeply controversial (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010)
and elicit different time perspectives (Slawinsky, 2010), different perceptual and analytical
scales (Wood, 2012), and different organizational routines and capabilities (McKnight, 2012).
Environmental issues are difficult to negotiate, even when partners want to move forward
and initiate responsible collective action. Whereas many other organizational actions are
internally focused and self-reliant, environmental issues often call for consultation and have
implications for many more external constituencies (Hart & Sharma, 2004). Each owner’s
decisions and actions potentially require consideration of their own multiple stakeholders
(Berrone et al., 2010; Branzei et al., 2004), further magnifying complexity and co-ordination
difficulties (Graicunas, 1937). Sometimes the interests of partners frequently change (Inkpen &
Beamish, 1997), and the identification of, let alone mutual commitment to, a shared interest
becomes hard to attain and sustain (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Dhanaraj, Branzei, &
Subramanian, 2013). Even when such commitments are fortuitously reached (Zietsma, 2002;
MacDonald, 2010), they may be unstable and therefore require consistent support or renewed
commitments (Hoffman, 2011).
Ownership dispersion can create internal frictions, even when partners agree on the
issues, understand how to address them, and express willingness to bear the costs needed to
improve their environmental performance. The paramount concerns of who contributes, who
benefits, and how (Mahoney, 2005; Libecap, 1989; Barzel, 1997) from each environmental
investment decision amplify the challenges in aligning the partners’ objectives. One partner’s
equity share may polarize commitment, with lower equity owners more prone to bystander
effects (Admati, 1994) and higher equity owners withstanding the lion’s share of societal
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pressure and bearing the brunt of irresponsibility attributions should anything go wrong (Lange
& Washburn, 2012).
While these arguments suggest that ownership dispersion should be inversely related to
environmental performance, some evidence exists to show that this effect is particularly
pronounced for ambiguous issues (Zietsma, 2002) that leave room for debate and/or contestation
over the appropriate course of action (MacDonald, 2010). As issues become clearer and more
legitimate, partners face fewer challenges and more incentives, often in the form of societal
pressures, to address their negative externalities (Gunningham, Kagen, & Thornton, 2004).
Many hazardous byproducts are harmful but to different extents. The effects of even
widely known harmful chemicals like DDT or asbestos are contested, and it can take decades to
reach consensus or unambiguously classify a substance (McGuire et al., 2013; McGuire &
Hardy, 2009). As long as ambiguity regarding a chemical’s harmfulness remains, debate and
disagreements among multiple owners will make it more complex, difficult, and costly to reach
consensus for abatement. Once hazardous chemicals receive a cancerous classification, however,
harm becomes less contestable (Berman & Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989), and partners
should face fewer challenges in agreeing upon pollution mitigation.
In addition to clear legal penalties, market mechanisms can shift incentives by
reallocating supply and demand (Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007). What society deems
unacceptable will further tighten the range of actions by holding up to public scrutiny those who
fail to do the right thing right away (Lange & Washburn, 2012). Partners may be differentially
sensitive to these external constraints, but the multiplicity of cues will guide them on a narrower
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and clearer path, making it more likely that they will agree to take joint action to mitigate their
cancerous externalities.
I therefore predict that JV facilities will remain equally mindful of addressing their
cancerous byproducts, regardless of ownership dispersion, because these substances are
perceived to be the most detrimental for society (Berman & Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989).
Thus, co-owners should face fewer challenges in identifying and agreeing upon pollution
mitigation for these substances because of the moral duty to protect the general public from
harm. However, JV organizations will increasingly struggle to address non-cancerous
externalities as ownership dispersion increases, because ownership dispersion dials up the
intractability of issues, the multiplicity of stakeholders and dynamics that ensue, the cost
associated with negotiating a common course, and the inner polarization of incentives and
punishments.
Hypothesis 1A: There is no relationship between ownership dispersion and pollution
mitigation for cancerous substances.
Hypothesis 1B: As ownership dispersion increases, co-owned facilities’ mitigation of
non-cancerous pollutants decreases.
3.3 TYPES OF PARTNERS
Over the past 10 years, several scholars have theorized that firms characterized by
different types of ownership perceive environmental costs and benefits differently. Therefore,
different types of partners may be more or less likely to advocate or act in environmentally
responsible ways (Berrone et al., 2010; Darnall & Edwards, 2006; Sethi, 2003). Put differently,
some partners find it easier than others to align their self-interest with their moral duty.
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3.3.1 Government Effect
Typically in western societies, the intent of government participation in industry involves
facilitating the production and provision of goods and services that markets cannot reliably
provide independently (Downs & Larkey, 1986). Darnall and Edwards (2006) highlighted that
governments finance endeavours with the intent that benefits will accrue to society rather than
solely to the enterprise. Thus, a government financier should thoughtfully consider investments
that balance self-interest and moral duty. More importantly, having a government co-owner can
heighten the importance of pollution mitigation by overtly or implicitly encouraging the other
co-owners to more thoughtfully consider hazardous byproducts and their impact on society.
Notably, some studies have argued that the effects of government ownership are
contingent on efficiency. Since government firms are typically less efficient and less productive
than non-government firms (Brown, Earle, & Telegdy, 2006; Megginson & Netter, 2001;
Mascarenhas, 1989), and productive firms typically pollute less (Cui, Lapan, & Moschini, 2012;
Holladay, 2010), governmental ownership can be associated with poorer environmental
outcomes, especially in underdeveloped economies (Meyer & Pac, 2013; Wang & Jin, 2007).
However, government-backed firms are more likely to internalize environmental externalities
(Cato, 2008; Baumol & Oates, 1988), while non-government owners tend to overlook them
(Beladi & Chao, 2006). Further, some studies suggest that government ownership typically
improves environmental performance once industry-effects are accounted for, even in
developing economies (Earnhart & Lizal, 2006).
Sharing equity with a government co-owner, who is not only a participant or financier but
also an enforcer of laws, regulations, and societal expectations, is fairly common, especially in
highly polluting industries (Earnhart & Lizal, 2006). While governmental co-ownership may be
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over-represented among environmentally under-performing industries, firms partnering with
government can signal transparency (they attract attention), accountability (they reassure critics),
and willingness to invest in improved performance (or risk being made an example of) (Lin &
Darnall, 2010).24 I therefore predict a positive correlation between the percentage of government
ownership in a JV facility and pollution mitigation for cancerous and non-cancerous hazardous
byproducts.
Hypothesis 2: A higher percentage of government ownership in co-owned facilities will
increase pollution mitigation for a) cancerous and b) non-cancerous
byproducts.
3.3.2 Private-firm Effect
I rely on Environment Canada’s definition of private firms as those firms owned by the
private sector yet not publicly traded, excluding sole-proprietorships, crown corporations, and
corporate partnerships.25 Relatively few studies directly examine the relationship between private
ownership, as defined, and environmental performance, but some evidence suggests that private
firms will underperform non-private firms. Compared with their publically traded counterparts,
private firms tend to be undercapitalized and typically have fewer slack resources (George, 2005;
Baker, Pricer, & Ninde, 2000; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, & Rosen, 1994a, 1994b) that provide
firms greater freedom to pursue social objectives (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Private firms also
place less emphasis on developing environmental performance measurement indicators than

24

Potential partners with government will likely envisage, ex ante, the added responsibilities and scrutiny that
accompany a government partner. Heavy polluters that already struggle to comply with environmental regulations
may refrain from partnering with the enforcer of environmental regulations, and government may refrain from
partnering with heavy polluters to prevent granting legitimacy to corporate partners who skirt societal expectations.
25

Private ownership has numerous meanings within different literatures (Perry & Rainey, 1988). Many
sustainability scholars use the term private ownership to characterize all non-public sector (i.e., non-government)
and non-communal (Wang & Jin, 2007) owners, but this definition of private ownership comprises multiple
categories of firms, including JVs, family firms, sole proprietorships, and firms that are privately held yet not
publicly traded. Each category of private firms likely exhibits unique characteristics that could systematically
influence environmental outcomes.
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public firms (Henri & Journeault, 2008). Lee (2009) found that private firms emit more Benzine
than non-private firms26 and attributes this finding to greater managerial autonomy and shelter
from public scrutiny.
However, shelter from outside pressures could provide private firms more flexibility to
pursue socially beneficial initiatives. Agency theory scholars argue that equity markets (Schulze
et al., 2001; Bosch, Eckerd, & Lee, 1998; Gersick et al., 1997), in general, and specifically the
threat of hostile takeover (Walsh & Seward, 1990) prioritize profit maximization (Fama &
Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). Refraining from equity markets, and thus the market for corporate
control, may grant private firms more freedom to prioritize moral duty within their JV
subsidiaries.
Some agency scholars further suggest that private ownership affords owner-managers too
much freedom and thus creates its own unique agency costs. Schulze .et al. (2001), for instance,
highlight that private firm owner-managers oftentimes lack self-control and make excessively
altruistic decisions. In a study of family control over public firms, Berrone et al. (2004) argue
that family owners pursue non-economic utilities that build socio-emotional wealth, such as
perpetuating a positive family image and reputation (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005), building
personal prestige in the community (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Dane et al., 1999; Tagiuri &
Davis, 2004), and accumulating social capital (Arregle et al., 2007).27 In other words, families’
social identities can become intertwined with the social performance and actions of firms in
which they hold substantial ownership (Westhead, Cowling, & Howorth, 2001; Birley, Ng, &
Godfrey, 1999; Fletcher, 2000).
26

It remains unclear whether Lee includes sole-proprietorships within his definition of private firms.

27

Berrone et al. (2010) define family ownership as five percent equity ownership in a publically traded firm.
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If private owners remain more sensitive to environmental externalities and experience
greater utility from environmental performance, then a higher percentage of private ownership
should translate into better environmental outcomes (in my case, more pollution mitigation). As
with all other types of owners, private firms may be more sensitive to cancerous than noncancerous byproducts due to the known and unambiguous harm the former can cause (Berman &
Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989). If private owners’ unconstrained reign allows them to take
more decisive action, as prior studies seem to suggest (Schulze et al., 2001), I also expect
stronger and more substantive effects for the mitigation of cancerous emissions.
Hypothesis 3: A higher percentage of private-firm ownership in co-owned facilities will
increase pollution mitigation for a) cancerous and b) non-cancerous
byproducts.
3.3.3 Russian-Doll Effect
In contrast to government owners who increase transparency and private owners who
leverage transparency when following their pro-social values, facilities can also opt for equity
contributions by other joint ventures. In such cases, a new and different configuration of secondorder partners non-additively increases the costs of agreeing upon socially beneficial
environmental investments while simultaneously sheltering those indirect co-owners from some
of the friction and frustration of working out a common course and from blame if such a course
is never found. This configuration simultaneously overplays self-interest and downplays moralduty, making it more likely to act as a spanner in the works, dampening down collective efforts
and/or collective efficiency at mitigating hazardous emissions.
Effectively, such second-order JV ownership overtaxes even the best-intended decisionmakers (Mallard, 2012) and makes it more challenging to find meaningful links between the
issues firms confront and the courses they choose (Weiner, 1995) – in this case, firms’ efforts
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and/or efficiency at mitigating hazardous waste. Fösterling (1988) explained that this cognitive
link becomes less likely when more steps in the logical chain of events separate the evaluated
cause and effect, when more intertwined influences contribute to the outcome (Teigen & Brun,
2011), and when organizations have less control over the activities that led to the outcome
(Struthers et al., 2004). Because a JV parent creates more distance between the parent’s
corporate owners and the effect of the subsidiary JV’s environmental performance, a JV parent
not only significantly thickens the ranks of influential parties working on any given issue28 but
also dampens everyone’s ability to recognize and agree upon the appropriate course of action.
So it is neither added self-interest nor the ability to hide lower moral responsibility that
gets in the way but, rather, a default to profit-maximization that disconnects moral-duty within
subsidiary operations from decision-making within the JV parent. This condition creates a
Russian-doll effect whereby each additional layer of ownership further reduces a JV subsidiary’s
ability to address hazardous externalities. This effect may be even stronger for cancerous
chemicals, where the first-order owners may be more willing and likely to mitigate emissions in
the first place, but they remain unable to convince a parent JV owners-in-hiding, which impose
their own financial interests.
Hypothesis 4: A higher percentage of joint-venture ownership in co-owned facilities
will decrease pollution mitigation for a) cancerous and b) non-cancerous
byproducts.

28

The number of relationships surrounding a JV is represented by the equation
, where N equals the number
of parties affiliated with the joint-venture. The number of relationships parent JV managers must consider is
surrounding a parent equation
, where P equals the number of parties affiliated with the parent
JV and N equals the number of parties affiliated with the subsidiary joint-venture.
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3.4 COALITION HETEROGENEITY
In the previous section, I theorize that three types of owners (government, private firms
and joint-venture equity holders) drive co-owned facilities in different directions. While
government, private, and JV owners constitute large and often heterogeneous categories, theory
and evidence suggest that each group may share a recognizable cognitive frame29 (Polleta &
Jasper, 2001; Brickson, 2000; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Tyler, 1999), especially when it comes
to the ways they might go about addressing environmental externalities (Berrone et al., 2010;
Darnall & Edwards, 2006). For example, one would expect that government owners would
generally push for moral-duty (i.e., more mitigation and less harm) and JV owners would
subscribe to self-interested gains. But being pulled in different direction leaves unanswered the
logically next question: Which direction might prevail, and when?
Owners sharing the same frame may be quick to work through issues and converge on
agreeable solutions (Thomas & Ely, 2009; Grey, 1989; Lax & Sebenius, 1986), but the greater
the number of different frames, the longer and more non-linear the journey (Hoffman, 2011a,
2011b; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). In the last decade, a large and growing literature on crosssector solutions to environmental issues has suggested that different frames can be bent and
fused to unearth often unprecedented value and/or resolve intractable issues (Branzei & Le Ber,
2013; Le Ber & Branzei, 2010; Lin & Darnall, 2010). Indeed, while frame-bending and fusion
has its own costs, the benefits are often worthwhile. Even warring parties can overcome their
prior biases and break substantively different new grounds (Zietsma et al., 2002; MacDonald,
29

Institutional logics embody socially derived formal and informal rules that influence how managers from different
types of organizations construe meaning from their environment, evaluate problems, and ascribe value (Vurro,
Dacin & Perrini, 2010; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Boltanski & Thevenot, 1991). They provide context for social
influence in decision-making (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) and guide and constrain organizational behaviour by
signaling what constitutes rational and appropriate action (Thornton, 2004; March & Olsen, 1989) in and across
situations.
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2010). The greater the heterogeneity in the types of partners co-owning a facility, the greater the
chance that the significantly higher effort invested in working together will pay off (Thomas &
Ely, 2009; Lax & Sebenius, 1986) in the form of improved environmental performance.
Greater heterogeneity may prove particularly helpful in mitigating cancerous emissions
because of the recognized and agreed-upon harm attributable to these chemicals. Non-cancerous
chemicals, however, may garner less attention since they are generally perceived to be less
detrimental to human health (Berman & Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989) and their harm
remains contestable. In other words, greater heterogeneity may undermine or deemphasize
mitigating non-cancerous chemicals. I therefore predict a positive relationship between coalition
heterogeneity and pollution mitigation for cancerous byproducts and an inverse relationship
between coalition heterogeneity and pollution mitigation for non-cancerous hazardous
byproducts.
Hypothesis 5: Co-owned facilities with more coalition heterogeneity will a) emit more
cancerous byproducts and b) mitigate less non-cancerous byproducts.
3.5 METHODS
3.5.1 Data and Sample
To examine the influence of ownership composition on JV’s pollution mitigation, I used
the National Pollution Release Inventory (NPRI), Canada’s federally legislated inventory of
industrial hazardous substances. The NPRI is similar to the U.S.-based Toxic Release Inventory
(TRI), which scholars commonly use to research environmental performance (Berchicci et al.,
2012; King & Lenox, 2001, 2002; King & Shaver, 2001; Klassen & Whybark, 1999). Along with
detailed information on each facility’s emissions and abatement efforts, the NPRI provides
additional facility-level information on the allocation of ownership that remains unavailable
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within the TRI. Specifically, it identifies not only whether a facility is independently or jointly
owned but also the composition of ownership within JVs.
Federal law requires annual reports from over 8,800 facilities exceeding 20,000 annual
man-hours and exceeding chemical-use thresholds for any one of over 300 hazardous chemicals
(Environment Canada, 2013a). Environment Canada is responsible for ensuring the integrity of
the self-reported data and randomly conducts on site visits to verify reports. If Environment
Canada identifies any inaccuracies, firms are legally obliged to correct their reports.
To eliminate bias attributable to new chemicals being added to reporting requirements
over time (Environment Canada, 2013d), I examined only those chemicals within the NPRI that
required reports as of 2004.30 An analysis of the data for inconsistencies or disparities suggested
that less than one percent of the reports appeared questionable to errors of omission and
commission,31 and thus the original publically available data was not altered. I examined the
population of non-military JV facilities between 2004 and 2009, providing a final sample of 315
JV facility-year observations for 86 JVs in 37 industries.32
3.5.2 Dependent Variable
I measured JVs’ environmental performance by examining their facilities’ pollution
mitigation – specifically, the amount of recycling and treatment of hazardous waste prior to

30

A list of chemicals examined in this analysis is provided in Appendix A.

31

An error of omission or commission was assumed when 1) a facility consistently filed reports for four contiguous
years and failed to provide a report in one of the years in the sampling frame, 2) a facility failed to report a chemical
one year while consistently reporting the chemical in previous and future years, 3) a facility report on a specified
chemical exceeded a 500% annual difference without being part of an apparent upward or downward trend for the
facility’s use of that chemical, and 4) where someone obviously made a data-entry error on the fields observed in
this study. No obvious data-entry errors occurred in the reports examined in this study.
32

A list of industries examined in this analysis is provided in Appendix B.
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disposal. This amount was not dependent upon nor predetermined by the levels of production; it
reflected voluntary action33 and was directly comparable across facilities.
I differentiated between cancerous and non-cancerous human health hazards by using the
Tool for the Reduction and Assessment of Chemical and other environmental Impacts (TRACI)
(Bare et al., 2003; Toffel & Marshall, 2004). TRACI provides weights for chemical hazards
based upon their cancerous and non-cancerous properties as well as their human exposure
pathways, that is, whether a chemical is inhaled or absorbed through ingestion or contact.34 I
calculated pollution mitigation measures with the equation:

∑
where

represents the total tonnage of chemical c recycled, typically affecting humans through

exposure pathway e, in year t for facility f, and

equals the hazardous weight provided by

TRACI for chemical c for exposure pathway e. represents the total tonnage of chemical c
treated prior to disposal. I performed a log transformation on the dependent variable to correct
for skewness and kurtosis.
3.5.3 Independent variables
JV scholars provide several thresholds, ranging from five percent (Killing, 1983) to
twenty percent (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004) equity ownership, that indicate when minority
partners actively participate in a JV. Since I examine the extent to which levels of ownership
33

While laws and regulations may limit certain releases of hazardous byproducts, facilities have multiple options for
disposing of hazardous waste without recycling or treatment prior to disposal.
34

Since, by definition, a treated or recycled chemical never leads to exposure, some assumptions are required to
weight chemical hazards for pollution mitigation. I used TRACI’s inhalation weights for treatment by incineration
and TRACI’s absorption weights for physical, chemical, biological, and municipal sewage treatment. For recycling,
I used TRACI’s inhalation weights for energy recovery and TRACI’s absorption weights for solvents, organic
substances, metals and metal compounds, inorganic materials, acids and bases, catalysts, abatement residue, and
used oil.
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influence environmental performance, I examined all equity joint ventures where the second
largest partner holds a minimum of five percent equity. I operationalized ownership dispersion
by using a Herfendahl-like measure that simultaneously accounted for the number of owners and
their respective shares:
∑

where n represents the number of each partner owning a portion of joint-venture j, and
represents the percentage ownership for partner n. The measure approached -1 for single owners
with high stakes (low dispersion) and zero for multiple owners with small stakes (high
dispersion).
I operationalized the influence of each type of partner by computing the percentage of
total ownership held by public firms, private firms, JV firms, and government agencies within
each JV.35 To avoid perfect multi-collinearity, I did not include public firms as a control; thus the
effects of private, JV, and government ownership were in relation to public ownership.
Coalition heterogeneity captures the spread of influence among four categories of owners
known to differ systematically in their preference for and attention to environmental issues –
government, private firms, public firms, and other (second-order) joint ventures.36 I used the
same Herfendahl-like formula used to calculate ownership dispersion, but aggregate the
percentage of ownership for each type of partner to capture coalition heterogeneity:
∑
35

I considered crown corporations as government ownership.

36

Because ownership dispersion by partner and ownership dispersion by partner type are distinct constructs, I
theorized and tested their effects separately; empirically the two measures were not significantly correlated and the
reported results were robust to their simultaneous inclusion.
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where g represents the category of ownership and equals the sum of ownership stakes by firms
in category g. This measure theoretically ranges between -1 and -0.25, equals -1 when all firms
belong to the same category, and equals -0.25 when all four categories of ownership are equally
represented.
I further probed the influence of dominant ownership by constructing two additional
measures. FiftyPlus captured majority ownership by any partner and was set to one if any partner
owned greater than 50% and zero otherwise. I controlled for the differential difficulty of
attaining agreement on any given issue by controlling for the number of partners in each joint
venture (NumberOfPartners). Since these additional measures were highly correlated with both
ownership dispersion and coalition heterogeneity, I included them in tests of partner-type
influence only.
3.5.4 Control Variables
Within the analysis, I also controlled for alternative explanations of environmental
performance. I included facility size (FacilitySize) and the number of peer facilities owned by the
same joint-venture (PeerFacilities) to capture any scale or scope economies in pollution
mitigation and/or learning effects across facilities. As in former pollution studies (Berchicci,
Dowell, & King, 2012; Harrison & Antweiler, 2003; King & Lenox, 2001, 2002; King & Shaver,
2001), as a crude measure of production, I operationalized FacilitySize by the number of facility
employees since larger facilities may achieve scale or scope economies for mitigating hazardous
waste and since larger firms adopt more proactive environmental policies (Darnall, Henriques, &
Sadorsky, 2010).
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I included the number of chemicals (NumberofChemicals) released by each facility since
prior research suggests that the number of chemicals processed by a facility may affect
hazardous waste processing, in part by creating opportunities for accelerating the development of
requisite capabilities (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2011; S. Hart, 1995; Russo & Fouts, 1997). I
included the percentage of foreign ownership (ForeignOwnership) since King and Shaver (2001)
suggested that foreign-owned establishments may produce more unique waste that could hinder
their pollution abatement efforts. I also included the percentage of ownership represented by
firms on the S&P 500 index and the S&P TSX 60 index (S&P Constituent) to capture the
influence of additional market scrutiny on environmental performance (Lee, 2009; Villalonga,
2004). Finally, I included the volume of hazardous waste (Byproducts) produced by each facility,
cancerous (CanByproducts) and non-cancerous (NoncanByproducts), respectively, in case
hazardous waste volume influences pollution mitigation.
3.5.6 Analysis
I used standard OLS pooled regression analysis, clustering errors by facility to capture
correlation in the error term arising from the same JV facilities reporting in multiple years
(Rodgers, 1993). Province, year, and industry (3-digit SIC) fixed effects accounted for
differences arising from cultural and legal differences, annual trends, and industry specific
factors. The following two equations present the baseline regressions for the analysis:
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The baseline model captured 43.8% of the variance in the data for cancerous pollution
mitigation and 72.7% of the variance for non-cancerous pollution mitigation. The independent
variables contributed to an additional 0.1% to 15.2% statistical significance in the model.
However, more importantly (Miller, 2008; Weisberg, 2004), the independent variables
demonstrated substantive significance in explaining variance in pollution mitigation for
substances known to cause human harm.
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations for the data used in the
analysis. Correlations among predictors and control variables were modest to moderate, and the
largest variance inflation factor among independent variables was 4.01, alleviating concerns
about multi-collinearity (Kennedy, 1997; Neter et al., 1996). As expected, JV facilities produced
far more non-cancerous than cancerous byproducts, and perhaps because of this disparity, JV
facilities addressed approximately 5.18% of their non-cancerous waste through pollution
mitigation but only 0.28% of their cancerous waste. This finding could result from different
technologies, capabilities, or control efficiencies.
Table 8 reports the unhypothesized effects of the predictors on hazardous waste volume.
While the patterns of hazardous waste volume may foreshadow some of the predictions, they
cannot fully explain why ownership will elicit different patterns of pollution mitigation.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations
Mean
SD
1
Non-cancerous volume
251,240 943,619
2
Cancerous volume
28.28
276
3
Non-cancerous mitigation
13,001 94,179
4
Cancerous mitigation
0.08
0.57
5
Ownership dispersion
-0.47
0.10
6
Percent government ownership
0.02
0.10
7
Percent private ownership
0.18
0.28
8
Percent partnership ownership
0.05
0.15
9
Coalition heterogeneity
-0.84
0.21
10 Facility size
457
747
11 Peer facilities
4.62
16.31
12 Foreign ownership
24.17
35.64
13 S&P constituency
23.89
32.41
14 Number of chemicals
13.11
11.67
15 Number of partners
2.75
1.41
16 Fifty plus
0.48
0.50

Min
0
0
0
0
-0.91
0
0
0
-1
2
0
0
0
1
2
0

Max
6,968,242
4,859
905,034
6.00
-0.20
0.51
1
0.95
-0.43
4,600
121
100
100
57
8
1

1
1
0.0508
0.0884
-0.0364
-0.0302
-0.0508
-0.1267
-0.0501
-0.1444
0.0891
-0.0409
-0.1428
-0.0647
0.2654
-0.0489
-0.1728

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
0.3557
-0.0078
0.2060
-0.0188
-0.0336
-0.0163
-0.0096
0.3125
-0.0187
-0.0541
0.1230
0.2683
0.2761
-0.0771

1
-0.0173
0.3588
-0.0296
-0.0618
-0.0433
-0.0450
0.5946
-0.0241
-0.0758
0.2188
0.4251
0.5042
-0.1318

1
0.1776
-0.0288
-0.0857
-0.0428
0.0433
-0.0671
-0.0056
-0.0936
0.0535
0.1274
0.0142
-0.1310

1
-0.0387
-0.0755
-0.3027
0.0854
0.2518
-0.0684
-0.1438
0.2464
0.1102
0.7752
-0.3687

1
0.0111
0.3408
0.3378
-0.0886
-0.0498
-0.0038
-0.1566
-0.0476
-0.0571
-0.0040

1
0.0172
0.5107
-0.1695
0.0050
0.0428
-0.2377
-0.1909
-0.1640
0.1163

1
0.3565
-0.0959
0.0800
0.1750
-0.2156
0.0359
-0.0868
0.1501

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
9
Coalition heterogeneity 1
10 Facility size
-0.1479 1
11 Peer facilities
-0.0313 -0.0960
1
12 Foreign ownership
0.0106 0.0434
0.0078 1
13 S&P constituency
-0.3166 0.0438 -0.1114 -0.2021 1
14 Number of chemicals
-0.1176 0.3910
0.0752 -0.2826 -0.0585 1
15 Number of partners
-0.0220 0.3516 -0.0816 -0.1047
0.3671
0.1903 1
16 Fifty plus
0.0210 -0.1603
0.1632
0.2463 -0.0308 -0.2232 -0.1269 1
Note: n = 315. The minimum reported total toxic emissions exceeds zero, but rounds to zero. Correlations (absolute value) greater than 0.1105 (0.1449) are significant
at the 5% (1%) level.
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Table 8: Predictors on un-hypothesized hazardous waste volume
Cancerous
Byproducts

Dispersion

Cancerous
Byproducts

Non-cancerous
Hazardous
Byproducts

- 3.1673
(17.4702)

Non-cancerous
Hazardous
Byproducts

Non-cancerous
Hazardous
Byproducts

Cancerous
Byproducts

- 14.1234
(13.1030)

Perc. Private

7.3896
(3.8166)

Perc. Partnership

- 43.3708
(20.6027)
**

- 11.8154
(7.2648)

**

- 4.8592
(6.3846)
- 15.8416
(14.2749)

Own-type Dispersion

- 0.4117
(1.6853)

Ln(Peer Facilities)

- 3.8426
(2.5261)

*

- 3.8646
(2.5410)

Ln(Foreign Ownership)

0.2696
(0.1038)

***

Ln(S&P Constituent)
Ln(No. Chemicals)

- 0.3848
(1.6148)

0.8616
(4.5818)

22.3336
(15.6261)

- 4.2112
(4.5439)

- 0.3739
(1.7102)

1.0472
(3.8832)

0.0665
(4.1644)

- 0.6107
(3.9954)

0.3092
(1.2730)

*

- 0.3112
(2.8993)

0.2433
(2.9454)

- 3.6013
(2.3189)

*

- 2.6696
(3.4473)

- 3.8259
(2.5547)

*

0.1212
(2.9234)

0.2748
(0.1137)

***

0.1970
(0.2443)

0.0658
(0.1866)

0.4296
(0.1600)

***

- 0.0298
(0.1788)

0.2666
(0.1015)

***

0.1190
(0.2337)

- 0.1833
(0.1528)

- 0.1844
(0.1525)

*

- 0.2695
(0.2247)

- 0.2415
(0.2436)

- 0.2411
(0.1540)

*

- 0.1058
(0.2232)

- 0.1770
(0.1661)

- 0.1071
(0.2628)

2.9747
(3.0102)

2.9555
(2.9872)

4.8575
(3.0886)

*

16.0132
(5.6746)

***

2.9991
(3.0368)

14.7099
(6.5890)

50.1059
(28.3765)

*

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

0.4348
0.1510
86
315

0.4588
0.0020
86
315

0.2989
0.0151
86
315

14.0777
(6.4697)

**

14.5604
(6.0302)

Ln(No. Partners)

***

- 10.0506
(8.2780)

Fifty_plus

Province Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

Non-cancerous
Hazardous
Byproducts

76.6790
(63.2282)

Perc. Govt.

Ln(Facility Size)

Cancerous
Byproducts

4.4646
(1.9001)
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

0.4608
0.4588
0.2838
0.4799
0.3363
Adjusted
0.0020
0.0211
0.0525
Δ
Facilities
86
86
86
86
86
n
315
315
315
315
315
p<.001 = ***; p<.01 = **; p<.05 = *; p<.1 = *, one-tailed
Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parentheses
Percent government, private, and partnership ownership in relation to ownership by publically traded firms
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**

8.8703
(3.3696)

***

*

**

2.6 RESULTS
Table 9 provides the results of the main analysis. Hypothesis 1A predicted that, ceteris
paribus, JV facilities will mitigate a similar amount of cancerous byproducts because the
cancerous classification removes doubt as to the hazard and the appropriateness of addressing
these substances. Consistent with the hypothesis 1A, Table 9 shows that greater ownership
dispersion does not influence the mitigation of cancerous emissions – dispersed and concentrated
owners mitigate cancerous emissions to a similar extent. A power analysis of the null hypothesis
for a sample size of 325, a minimum

of 0.5352, 58 predictors, a sample size of 315, and a

type-1 error rate of .001 indicated the statistical power for the regression is 1, confirming there
was sufficient statistical power to support the null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1B explained that facilities will mitigate less non-cancerous waste as
ownership dispersion increases because, as the number of owners increases and as their equity
shares become more balanced, they will increasingly struggle to align divergent interests and
their likelihood of accolades or blame for environmental performance declines. Counter to the
hypothesis, the results indicated a strong and significant positive relationship between ownership
dispersion and pollution mitigation for non-cancerous byproducts; thus, I reject hypothesis 1B.
While JVs with more owners face additional challenges in aligning interests and agreeing
(Parkhe, 1993; van de Ven, 1976; Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Demsetz, 1967), more represented
interests and opinions in the ownership coalition appears to lead to better outcomes, perhaps by
bringing together a broader range of capabilities (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2011; Sharma &
Vrendenburg, 1998; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Shrivastava, 1995) and/or co-creating economies of
scale and scope.
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Table 9: JV ownership coalition characteristics and pollution mitigation for cancerous and non-cancerous byproducts
Hypothesis 1A
Pollution
Mitigation
Cancer

Dispersion

Pollution
Mitigation
Cancer

Pollution
Mitigation
Non-cancer

- 2.6527
(5.0833)

Hypothesis 1B

Hypotheses
2A, 3A, 4A

Hypotheses
2B , 3B, 4B

Hypothesis 5A

Hypotheses 5B

Pollution
Mitigation
Non-cancer

Pollution
Mitigation
Cancer

Pollution
Mitigation
Non-cancer

Pollution
Mitigation
Cancer

Pollution
Mitigation
Non-cancer

11.5365
(7.8747)

*

Perc. Govt.

18.7431
(5.8753)

Perc. Private

0.4775
(1.1065)

- 4.3197
(4.6963)

- 1.9558
(2.6298)

0.7700
(5.1007)

Perc. Partnership

***

12.0307
(8.4815)

*

Own Type Dispersion
Ln(Facility Size)

- 2.4149
(1.3644)

**

- 2.3925
(1.3636)

*

- 0.6908
(1.2900)

Ln(Peer Facilities)

- 1.0542
(0.6306)

**

- 1.0736
(0.6292)

*

- 1.9484
(1.4521)

Ln(Foreign Ownership)

0.0286
(0.0686)

0.0330
(0.0697)

Ln(S&P Constituent)

- 0.0049
(0.0367)

- 0.0059
(0.0370)

Ln(No. Chemicals)

4.0560
(1.4271)

***

4.0406
(1.4299)

***

*

- 6.7689
(4.0556)

- 0.6105
(1.0690)

- 2.2533
(1.2894)

**

- 0.9886
(1.2583)

- 0.7881
(1.2658)

- 1.8622
(1.0526)

- 1.8716
(1.4655)

- 0.8716
(0.5275)

- 1.4955
(1.3069)

- 0.9843
(0.6023)

- 2.0771
(1.3951)

0.0257
(0.0945)

0.0089
(0.0931)

- 0.0118
(0.0407)

- 0.0030
(0.0937)

0.0158
(0.0642)

0.0478
(0.0955)

- 0.1332
(0.1374)

- 0.1321
(0.1323)

- 0.0026
(0.0268)

- 0.1319
(0.1193)

0.0218
(0.0429)

- 0.1804
(0.1413)

8.0478
(1.8864)

*

****

8.2744
(1.8805)

****

3.3881
(1.2905)

*

3.6831
(2.6240)

***

6.3351
(2.1105)

Ln(No. Partners)

- 4.2257
(4.7710)

- 2.2194
(4.9171)

Fifty_plus

0.4648
(0.7416)

- 5.1682
(2.3106)

Ln(Can Byproducts)

0.0344
(0.0295)

0.0342
(0.0299)

Ln(Noncan Byproducts)
Province Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Adjusted
Δ
Facilities
n

***

****

0.0916
(0.0267)

****

***

7.7501
(2.0192)

0.1316
(0.0262)

****

0.1102
(0.0276)

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

0.4375

0.4365
0.0010
86
315

0.7266

0.7292
0.0026
86
315

0.5890
0.1515
86
315

0.7543
0.0281
86
315

0.4471
0.0096
86
315

0.7320
0.0054
86
315

86
315

p<.001 = ***; p<.01 = **; p<.05 = *; p<.1 = *, one-tailed
Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parentheses
Percent government, private, and partnership ownership in relation to ownership by publically traded firms
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****

0.0341
(0.0296)

YES
YES
YES

86
315

*

**

0.0337
(0.0314)
0.1027
(0.0260)

4.1613
(1.4334)

**

****

Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 suggested that different types of owners would drive
environmental outcomes in different directions. Hypothesis 2 explained that the additional
scrutiny that accompanies government ownership will encourage co-owned facilities to address
more hazardous externalities; that is, co-owners will be more likely to internalize and more
stringently mitigate their hazardous waste. Table 9 columns 5 and 6 show supportive evidence
for hypotheses 2A & 2B which state that government ownership improves pollution mitigation
for both cancerous and non-cancerous hazardous waste. The effects are practically important: for
each percent increase in government ownership, the results indicated an approximate 20.6%
increase in cancerous pollution mitigation37 and an approximate 12.8% increase in noncancerous pollution mitigation.38
Hypothesis 3 drew attention to the non-economic utility that private owners derive from
corporate social responsibility, predicting that a higher percentage of private ownership may
elicit greater mitigation for both types of chemicals. Neither was significant in my sample, so
there was no support for the hypothesized private-firm effect. Dialing up or down the percentage
of private ownership did not influence the level of mitigation for hazardous byproducts, and thus
hypotheses 3A and 3B are rejected. While non-significant, this finding should be interpreted with
caution. We know from prior literature that private firms are more likely to heed their own
values, but if an equal number subscribe to moral duty and profit-maximization perspectives, the
effects will effectively cancel each other out.

37

The percentage difference for JV facilities is determined by examining the exponentiated coefficient of the JV
indicator variable such that a one unit increase in corresponds to the change in the dependent variable. Since the
variable is a percentage: exp(
= exp(18.7431*0.01) – 1 = 0.2061
38

Using an indicator variable for government ownership in place of the percentage of government ownership
indicated that government ownership significantly and substantially increased cancerous pollution mitigation, but
non-cancerous pollution mitigation was non-significant.
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Hypothesis 4 predicted a Russian doll effect whereby the more equity other joint-ventures
hold in a co-owned facility, the harder it gets for the partners at the table to identify and agree
upon appropriate action. The hypothesized effects were, again, non-significant, so hypotheses 4A
and 4B are rejected. This result suggests that even abnormal complications, such as adding high
percentages of nested JV ownership, do not set facilities back, despite the cognitive limits of
managers and their inability to address such complex and conflicting environmental issues.
Future studies may provide additional insights into the sensitivity of co-owned facilities to
multiple layers of equity ownership and other forms of control, asking whether it is the
indirectness of this type of holding or its hidden nature that keeps JV-owned facilities in this
study comparable to their peers.
The last hypothesis stated that greater coalition heterogeneity will improve the ability of
co-owned facilities to mitigate cancerous byproducts and undermine their ability to mitigate noncancerous byproducts. Theoretically, H5 mirrors H1 with one difference. Precisely because of
the added complexity and co-ordination challenges associated with finding and fusing different
frames, I argued and found that co-owned facilities try harder and succeed at ratcheting up
mitigation for cancerous waste. Consistent with hypothesis 5B, I also found that greater partnertype heterogeneity was associated with lesser effort and/or effectiveness at mitigating noncancerous emissions. A summary of hypothesized effects along with the analysis findings is
provided in Table 10.
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Table 10: Summary of hypothesized effects and analysis findings

Hypothesis
H1A:

Finding

There is no relationship between ownership dispersion and
pollution mitigation for cancerous substances

Supported

H1B: As ownership dispersion increases, co-owned facilities’ pollution
mitigation for non-cancerous hazardous substances decreases.

Not supported

H2A: A higher percentage of government ownership increases pollution
mitigation for cancerous byproducts

Supported

H2B: A higher percentage of government ownership increases pollution
mitigation for non-cancerous byproducts.

Supported

H3A: A higher percentage of private-firm ownership increases pollution
mitigation for cancerous substances.

Not supported

H3B: A higher percentage of private-firm ownership increases pollution
mitigation for non-cancerous substances.

Not supported

H4A: A higher percentage of joint-venture ownership decreases pollution
mitigation for cancerous substances.

Not supported

H4A: A higher percentage of joint-venture ownership decreases pollution
mitigation for non-cancerous substances.

Not supported

H5A: Co-owned facilities with more coalition heterogeneity mitigate more
cancerous byproducts

Supported

H5B: Co-owned facilities with more coalition heterogeneity mitigate less
non-cancerous byproducts

Supported

3.6.1 Robustness Checks
Studies of environmental performance remain highly susceptible to measurement error,
especially for studies of hazardous byproducts. Toffel and Marshal (2004) highlighted that
whether or not significant findings arise partially depends upon the weighting mechanisms
scholars use to capture the hazard associated with each chemical. To provide a stronger test of
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the hypothesized relationships, I reweighted chemical hazards using the Environmental Defense
Fund’s Toxicity Equivalent Potential Scorecard (TEPS) and reran analysis for the hypothesized
relationships in this study. TEPS is similar to TRACI in that it provides cancerous and noncancerous weights for chemicals based upon their human exposure pathways. However, TEPS
examines fewer chemicals than TRACI, which could account for differences between the
robustness checks and main analysis. The results of these robustness checks are provided in
Table 11.
The robustness checks replicated all the findings in the main analysis, with two
exceptions. First, the robustness check of the relationship between government ownership and
improved pollution mitigation failed to find evidence that government ownership improves the
ability of co-owned facilities to mitigate non-cancerous byproducts. Notably, the robustness
check did reconfirm increased mitigation of cancerous byproducts. Second, the robustness check
of the relationship between private ownership and non-cancerous pollution mitigation was
significant, although counter to the direction hypothesized. This result was somewhat surprising,
given that prior studies of family control over public firms examined cases of co-ownership
among widely dispersed principles (Berrone et al., 2010). However, we might expect that the
influence of family ownership creates a broad range of responses because private firms can take
greater liberty to do a lot more, or a lot less, depending on what they value.
.
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Table 11: Robustness checks examining JV ownership coalition characteristics and pollution mitigation for cancerous and non-cancerous substances.
Robustness
Robustness
Robustness 1A
Robustness 1B
Robustness 5A Robustness 5B
2A, 3A, 4A
2B, 3B, 4B
Pollution
Mitigation
Cancer

Dispersion

Pollution
Mitigation
Cancer

Pollution
Mitigation
Non-Cancer

- 2.7191
(5.0703)

Pollution
Mitigation
Non-Cancer

12.7187
(8.3332)

Pollution
Mitigation
Cancer

Pollution
Mitigation
Non-Cancer

18.6058
(5.8503)

Perc. Private

0.4732
(1.0965)

- 7.6149
(4.1498)

Perc. Partnership

- 2.0594
(2.6100)

3.7422
(5.4209)

***

7.2817
(7.7485)
**

Own Type Dispersion

- 2.3959
(1.3550)

**

- 2.3729
(1.3538)

**

- 0.6731
(1.3573)

Ln(Peer Facilities)

- 1.0581
(0.6240)

**

- 1.0773
(0.6223)

*

- 2.2634
(1.3411)

Ln(Foreign Ownership)

0.0271
(0.0687)

0.0316
(0.0697)

Ln(S&P Constituent)

- 0.0048
(0.0365)

- 0.0058
(0.0367)

Ln(No. Chemicals)

4.0426
(1.4196)

***

4.0263
(1.4225)

**

- 0.9837
(1.3536)

- 0.9906
(0.5962)

*

- 2.4043
(1.3016)

- 0.8791
(0.5207)

*

- 2.2159
(1.2758)

0.0158
(0.0869)

0.0079
(0.0869)

- 0.0126
(0.0405)

- 0.0409
(0.0841)

0.0147
(0.0643)

0.0380
(0.0893)

- 0.0250
(0.1013)

- 0.0236
(0.0976)

- 0.0028
(0.0264)

- 0.0194
(0.0868)

0.0214
(0.0426)

- 0.0763
(0.1088)

4.1474
(1.4267)

8.4250
(2.0801)

****

0.0815
(0.0464)

*

8.6951
(1.9386)

****

8.8823
(1.9573)

****

3.3864
(1.2838)

***

7.0839
(2.3219)

- 3.9606
(1.9320)

0.0352
(0.0294)

**

***

YES
YES
YES

*

0.0605
(0.0471)
YES
YES
YES

0.4379
0.4371
0.7249
0.7287
Adjusted
0.0008
0.0038
Δ
Facilities
86
86
86
86
n
315
315
315
315
p<.001 = ***; p<.01 = **; p<.05 = *; p<.1 = *, one-tailed
Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parentheses
Percent government, private, and partnership ownership in relation to ownership by publically traded firms

0.0345
(0.0291)
0.0869
(0.0515)

*

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

0.4942
0.0563
86
315

0.7561
0.0312
86
315

0.4452
0.0073
86
315

0.7309
0.0060
86
315
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*

**

0.0343
(0.0302)
0.0738
(0.0474)

YES
YES
YES

*

- 2.1754
(1.3566)

**

0.5259
(0.7081)

YES
YES
YES

- 2.2372
(1.2813)

*

- 0.8635
(1.2758)

Fifty_plus

Province Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

- 7.2931
(4.3609)

*

1.9134
(6.0104)

Ln(Noncan Byproducts)

*

- 1.8464
(1.0465)

- 4.2045
(4.7430)

0.0352
(0.0291)

3.6268
(2.6059)
- 0.7980
(1.3264)

Ln(No. Partners)

Ln(Can Byproducts)

Pollution
Mitigation
Non-Cancer
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3.7 DISCUSSION
This study provides new insights into the relationship between ownership and
environmental outcomes by theorizing and testing how multiple and different types of owners
shape one critical aspect of JVs’ environmental performance – namely, pollution mitigation. By
examining the characteristics of ownership coalitions within JV organizations, I uncovered why
some JV facilities address their hazardous externalities more than others. Specifically, the
characteristics of the coalition and the characteristics of its members systematically influence the
extent to which JV facilities exhibit a moral duty or profit maximization tendencies when
considering pollution mitigation. The tendency hinges upon the characteristics of the coalition
and the characteristics of its members.
Relatively equal partners shift the tendency toward moral duty, while majority-ownership
shifts the tendency toward profit-maximization, although to a lesser extent. More owners with
more balanced equity stakes raise the bar for mitigating non-cancerous hazardous byproducts,
even though these coalitions face greater difficulties aligning interests and coming to agreement
(Parkhe, 1993; van de Ven, 1976; Cartwright & Zander, 1968). While my data could not identify
why this shift occurs, two explanations seem likely. Similar co-owners with relatively equal
shares may be more likely to actively discuss operational decisions and their environmental
impacts, thus elucidating potential harm and facilitating discussions of moral duty. Alternatively,
JV managers representing similar yet dispersed owners may have more discretion or direction in
making socially beneficial operational decisions.
In contrast to ownership dispersion, coalition heterogeneity exhibits a nuanced
relationship with pollution mitigation. When different types of owners participate in the JV
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coalition, and when the categories of ownership are symmetric, facilities’ pollution mitigation for
non-cancerous byproducts suffers and pollution mitigation for cancerous byproduct improves.
Similarity improves partners’ co-operation (Brickson, 2000; Tyler, 1999) and thus facilitates
agreement upon the necessity, appropriateness, and manner of mitigating harm, but different
perspectives among coalition members can undermine the remission of ambiguous and/or
contestable harm. When different viewpoints regarding the appropriateness of mitigating
hazardous waste ensue, the JV shifts towards a profit-maximization tendency that indisputably
contributes to economic interests of owners. Notably, the contestation of harm places the locus of
tendency upon chemicals’ socially designated and accepted hazards; the cancer/non-cancer
classification appears to polarize JVs’ response to moral duty. In cases of known harm (cancer),
more heterogeneous JV coalitions go above and beyond to address hazardous externalities, thus
shifting to a moral-duty tendency.
Government ownership appears to tip the scale in favour of moral duty. Again, the data in
this study could not determine the exact mechanism by which this shift occurs, but the effects of
government ownership were significant and substantial for pollution mitigation of cancerous and
non-cancerous substances. It is possible that government imposes its will in favour of moral duty
– namely, more pollution mitigation – ex ante as condition of its financial backing of a venture.
It is equally likely that the very presence of government within the ownership coalition naturally
shifts the perspective towards moral duty as owners consider the enforcer of social expectations
within their midst.
3.7.1 Limitations
As in any empirical undertaking, this study has a number of limitations. First, this study
examines only one dimension of environmental performance, pollution mitigation. I chose to
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examine pollution mitigation deliberately because it is comparable across facilities, firms, and
industries and bears immediate and notable consequences for human health. However, the
relationship between JV facilities’ ownership composition and pollution prevention may differ
because of the substantial resource commitments (Arora & Cason, 1995; Hirschhorn, 1994),
ambiguity of returns (King & Lenox, 2002; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Elkington, 1998; Hart &
Ahuja, 1996), and delayed returns (Slawinski, 2010; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001) surrounding these
initiatives. This potential difference gives rise to future opportunities to explore additional
relationships between these and other characteristics of ownership and other aspects of
environmental performance.
Second, while I theorized that co-owners engage with one another and co-determine the
level of mitiation over hazardous emissions, the data did not allow me to verify whether or how
fully such engagement actually occurs. Some JV facilities represent collaboratively managed
operations while, in others, one owner is assigned operational authority and other partners
represent investors in the enterprise (Killing, 1983). It is possible that JVs with one operational
authority behave more like independent firms or majority-owned JVs than like collaboratively
managed ventures. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that co-owners without operational
authority still influence environmental performance. ConocoPhillips, for instance, recently
complained that a JV partner, China National Overseas Oil Corporation, prevented them from
prudently preparing for environmental containment in the event of an oil spill, even though
ConocoPhillips had operational authority over the co-owned facility (Rapoza, 2012; Watts,
2011).
While this example demonstrates that non-operating partners can influence
environmental performance, the extent to which JVs with one operational authority differ should
Page 79 of 121

receive more theoretical and empirical attention. If variance does exist in the nature and/or levels
of engagement, then the findings in this study constitute conservative estimates. Furthermore, my
findings are orientative rather than definitive. By showing how different characteristics of
ownership can be used as levers to systematically increase mitigation for cancerous and noncancerous emissions, I neither mean to imply that these predictors will always be effective nor
equally effective across facilities. I merely suggest that ownership matters and that it may offer
willing parties a wide range of tools to help them more deliberately balance self-interest and
moral duty.
Third, while the empirical context provides wide variance in coalition heterogeneity,
certain configurations of ownership are conspicuously missing. For example, none of the JVs in
the data contained a coalition of all JV owners or a coalition of government, JV owners, and
private owners without public ownership. Further, some of the existing configurations are more
highly represented in certain industries than others, and each type of owner does not necessarily
participate in each industry. It remains possible that certain types of industries share
characteristics that could partially explain variations in pollution mitigation or that different
types of owners behave differently in different industries.
3.7.2 Implications for Theory and Practice
While the findings are provocative, this study is merely a first step towards uncovering
how ownership coalitions shape environmental outcomes. The results may not fully generalize to
less regulated contexts or to other aspects of environmental performance dissociated with human
health. This study simply highlights that ownership coalitions matter, and it opens exciting new
opportunities for future studies to identify which configurations matter most, when, where, why,
and to what extent.
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On average, co-owned facilities address a much larger percentage of their non-cancerous
externalities through pollution mitigation compared to cancerous externalities. On the surface,
this appears to suggest that, overall, co-owned facilities do not put a lot of effort into reducing
cancerous externalities. However, the empirical context of this study does not indicate the level
of effort required to mitigate harm. Many cancerous substances, such as hexachlorodibenzofuran,
are highly toxic and do not require substantial exposure to produce acute effects. It remains
possible that organizations must work harder and/or must spend more resources to address
cancerous substances while, as a percentage of total hazards, the gains appear small. More
research at the individual chemical level of analysis would help to determine the effort required
for and the benefit gained from addressing each hazard.
Additional research at lower levels of analysis is also required to determine the exact
mechanisms by which ownership dispersion and coalition heterogeneity influence the moralduty/profit maximization tendency and whether, how, when, and why observed tendencies
change over time. While it is easy enough to examine organizational behaviour, archival data
alone cannot definitively determine why this behaviour occurs. Identifying the source of the
tendency, how it reifies, and how it manifests will provide valuable information into how it can
be changed for the common good.
This study clearly shows that co-owners can both help and hinder the mitigation of
hazardous externalities, and it helps to elucidate the theoretical premise and the practical
significance of choosing specific ownership configurations within JVs. Aside from the influence
of government ownership, potential JV participants likely remain unaware of the environmental
consequences of their organizing decisions. Building awareness of the environmental
implications of organizing could go a long way towards mitigating harm. Firms should not only
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ask “How do we organize to build economic value?” but also “How do we organize in the face of
perceivable harm?”
3.8 CONCLUSION
This study contributes to former studies of ownership and environmental performance by
showing how and theorizing why ownership coalitions influence pollution mitigation. I
demonstrate how the number of partners within a coalition, their equity stakes, and their
similarities and differences influence the extent to which organizations exhibit moral duty or
profit maximization tendencies. I find that ownership dispersion contributes to the mitigation of
non-cancerous hazards, thus contributing to a moral-duty tendency. However, coalition
heterogeneity polarizes pollution mitigation based upon contestable harm, undermining pollution
mitigation for non-cancerous yet hazardous byproducts and encouraging pollution mitigation for
cancerous substances. Overall, this study provides strong evidence that the characteristics of a
JV’s ownership coalition and the characteristics of the coalition’s members influence the extent
to which JV facilities protect society from definitive and contestable harm.
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Chapter 4:
CONCLUSION

This thesis brings to the fore the important but so far overlooked role co-ownership plays
in environmental performance. Public concerns over environmental degradation have
increasingly pressured firms and governments to address the imbalance between industry and the
natural environment, but firms significantly and substantially differ in how well they respond to
such public concerns and government policy.
Scholars have established that firms exhibit unique sensitivities to the costs and
incentives of environmental performance (Berrone et al., 2010; Darnall & Edwards, 2006;
Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007), but very little is known about if and how firms’ individual
preferences manifest in their co-owned subsidiary operations. My preliminary thesis posits that
joint-venture (JV) organizations struggle to pursue environmental performance because coownership confounds the alignment of social initiatives with each owner’s objectives, given coowners’ unique stakeholders (Darnall, Potoski, & Prakash, 2010; Darnall, Henriquez, &
Sadorsky, 2009), preferences (Berrone et al., 2010; Schulze et al., 2001), and expected returns
from these activities (Margolis et al., 2007; Branzei et al., 2004). I further argue that ambiguous
societal expectations and harm exacerbate these alignment difficulties.
The primary contribution of this dissertation is demonstrating that JVs, in general, and
specific aspects of co-ownership, more specifically, carry systematic yet predictable biases that
influence environmental performance. In Chapter 2, I argue that co-ownership creates a
multiplicity of goals and tools that make environmental issues harder to handle and costlier to
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manage. I find that co-ownership systematically increases hazardous emissions of non-cancerous
substances and that societal pressure in the form of more stringent legal liability appears
ineffective in regulating this bias. However, social consensus around the accepted harm of
cancerous substances (Berman & Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989) appears to encourage JV
facilities to be equally mindful in reducing cancerous emissions.
By focusing on why the simplest aspect of co-ownership (i.e., multiple versus single
owners) matters, I contribute to the sustainability literature by highlighting how added
complexity creeps in to confound already-challenging decisions. Co-owned facilities face a
myriad of decision points that must be negotiated, including how to invest, where to invest, and
how much to invest in environmental gains. When environmental outcomes hinge on multiple
partners’ ability to identify the intersection of everyone’s strategic interests and to develop a path
forward for environmental performance attainment, prioritizing socially-beneficial, yet
economically ambiguous, investments is much harder than in situations where one corporation
can unilaterally make decisions. I find robust evidence that environmental outcomes in JV
facilities are sub-optimal due to predictable challenges in aligning the various mix of incentives
for environmental performance into a unified strategy that is acceptable for and actionable by all
parties involved.
This chapter also isolates some conditions that aggravate the JV bias. For example,
ambiguous environmental categories make it much harder to agree, while unambiguous
categories smooth the path toward identifying common ground to address hazardous byproducts.
It also shows that neither social expectations nor regulations constitute effective antidotes for the
co-ownership bias. Disproportionate liability regimes do not constrain JV facilities’ emissions.
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However, a silver lining emerges when we delve more deeply into the differences between JVs;
the problems arising from co-ownership can also be addressed through co-ownership.
In Chapter 3, I explore multiple aspects of co-ownership and show how the
characteristics of the ownership coalition influence the actions facilities take to mitigate harm. I
argue that three specific characteristics shift the extent to which JVs exhibit moral duty or profit
maximization tendencies that polarize the accounts of when, why, and to what extent firms
mitigate hazardous externalities (Margolis et al., 2007; van de Ven & Jeurissen, 2005; Scalise,
2005; Cox & Hazen, 2003). First, I find robust evidence that JVs with more ownership
dispersion (i.e., more owners with more balanced equity shares) gravitate toward moral duty
tendency. JVs employ more pollution mitigation (i.e., recycling and treatment of hazardous
byproducts prior to disposal) as ownership dispersion increases, and they remain equally mindful
of mitigating cancerous byproducts regardless of ownership dispersion. Second, I find evidence
that who participates in the coalition matters. Government ownership pushes JVs toward a moral
duty tendency; facilities increasingly mitigate cancerous and non-cancerous byproducts as
government ownership increases. Finally, I find robust evidence that heterogeneity within the
coalition undermines pollution mitigation for non-cancerous substances and encourages pollution
mitigation for cancerous substances.
Chapter 3 identifies coordination difficulties as the mechanism by which the JV
coalition’s characteristics influence environmental outcomes. Broader and balanced
configurations build momentum towards working together to mitigate harm, but such enthusiasm
must be tempered by arguments that co-ordinating understanding and action across complex
issues is neither easy nor automatic. Greater diversity among partners creates challenges for
pulling everyone in the right direction and increases the odds of slipping by, cutting corners, or
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doing less when appropriate action and perceived harm remains contestable. When faced with
ambiguity and conflicting opinions, JVs gravitate toward profit-maximization, which at least
supports the financial interests of JV partners. However, in cases of less contestable harm, JVs
go above and beyond to safely address cancerous byproducts.
Overall, the empirical results in this thesis paint a picture of predictable, yet preventable,
harm from hazardous byproducts. Co-ownership can be a great force for good, and there is
increasing evidence that many parties can pool different resources and capabilities and overcome
previously intractable problems (Branzei & Le Ber, 2013). Facilities consistently can and do
behave similarly when it comes to cancerous byproducts, but they take considerable license
when harm is ambiguous and/or contestable. Notably, the results suggest that awareness and
agency inform organizational action. This finding resonates with a moral licensing argument in
which firms do right sometimes only to do wrong at other times (Merritt, Effron, & Monin,
2010; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009), but the current studies do not directly address this
angle. Longitudinal trajectories and repeated adjustments would be necessary before such
presumptions could be extended from organizations to decision-makers.
4.1 Contributions
This thesis contributes to theory by drawing attention to the levers and mechanisms that
confound organizations’ ability to address their hazardous byproducts. There has been increased
attention to the subjects of corporate wrongdoing, (Palmer, 2012; Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011;
Frooman, 1997), why decision-makers fall short (i.e. strategic choice) (Merritt, Effron, & Monin,
2010; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009), and why stakeholders often fail to encourage actions
that matter (Kock, Santaló, & Diestre, 2012; Darnall, Henriquez, & Sadorsky, 2009; Kassinis &
Vafeas, 2006; Alge, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999). I provide a socio-structural account of why
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some firms outperform others in addressing their hazardous byproducts. It is simply harder to
collectively organize the divergent interests of multiple partners, and heterogeneous coalitions
aggravate interest-alignment difficulties. Working with multiple co-owners provides more
opportunities for doing harm but also for apt correction.
Strategy scholars have spent considerable effort in attempting to entice firms into action
by theorizing and testing how environmental performance “pays.” Co-ownership provides a new
vantage point for incentives. Rather than taking incentives for granted, strategists must remember
that different firms have different incentives for pursuing environmental performance (van de
Ven & Jeurissen, 2005). One size does not fit all. What appeals to one, does not necessarily
appeal to another. In cases of co-ownership, it is important to look at the mix of incentives
brought to bear within the joint-venture and ask not only “When does it pay?” and “How does it
pay?” but also “To whom does it pay?” and “Why does it payoff for some more than others?”
This thesis also reveals that decision-makers recognize a moral duty to address their
hazardous byproducts; co-owned facilities can and do protect the public from harm when it
perceivably counts the most (i.e., cancerous byproducts). Attentiveness to the recycling and
treatment of non-cancerous byproducts substantially improves with increasingly dispersed
owners, who are less likely to face public censure for poor environmental outcomes (Teigen &
Brun, 2011; Gailey & Lee, 2005; Sanders & Hamilton, 1997; Shaver, 1996; Fösterling, 1988). In
cases of indisputable or less contestable hazard, heterogeneous coalitions, who face greater
challenges in aligning their interests (Hoffman, 2011a, 2011b; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010;
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), encourage far more recycling and treatment of cancerous waste.

Page 87 of 121

These findings highlight that addressing hazardous byproducts is not simply a matter of
corporate right-doing and wrongdoing but, rather, a series of decisions embedded within a sociostructural context (Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Maguire & Hardy, 2009) that really matters.
Categories of harm and perceptions of harm influence the extent to which decision-makers
overcome alignment difficulties to protect from harm. Making categories more relevant or
requiring facilities to report emissions in human terms, such as disability life-adjusted years,
could motivate more owners to act as one. Perhaps the simplest intervention lies in
communicating with decision-makers that how partners organize and with whom partners
organize has unintended societal consequences. Many facilities may be unaware that coownership holds them back, and appreciating the dangers and possibilities that stem from coownership may motivate some decision-makers to extend their mindfulness from cancerous
chemicals to more ambiguous hazards.
In conclusion, this thesis answers three important questions – whether, how, and to what
extent co-ownership influences one aspect of environmental performance. However, the most
important contribution derives from opening a conversation that links ownership to foreseeable
harm. While many lawyers may fear such connections, the patterns raise important warning signs
about how facilities deal with hazardous byproducts. Firms can and do mitigate such harm, but
co-ownership creates additional challenges and opportunities for addressing hazardous
byproducts. This dissertation identifies some of the mechanisms hindering joint-ventures’ efforts
in the hopes that successful prescriptions can be developed to assist co-owners reduce
disproportionate harm.
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Appendix A:
List of Chemicals Examined in the Analysis
Chemical

CAS Number

Chemical

CAS Number

4,6-Dinitro-2-sec-butylphenol

88-85-7

Benzo(a)phenanthrene - PAH

218-01-9

Abamectin

71751-41-2

Benzo(a)pyrene - PAH

50-32-8

Acenaphthene - PAH

83-32-9

Benzo(b)fluoranthene - PAH

205-99-2

Acetaldehyde

75-07-0

Benzo(k)fluoranthene - PAH

207-08-9

Acetamide

60-35-5

Benzoic acid

65-85-0

Acetic acid (2,4-dichlorophenoxy):2,4DAcetonitrile

94-75-7

Benzotrichloride

98-07-7

Benzyl chloride

100-44-7

Acetophenone

98-86-2

Beryllium (and its compounds)

7440-41-7

Acrolein

107-02-8

Beta-HCH

319-85-7

Acrylamide

79-06-1

Bifenthrin

82657-04-3

Acrylic acid (and its salts)

79-10-7

Biphenyl

92-52-4

Acrylonitrile

107-13-1

Bis (2-chloroethyl) ether

111-44-4

Aldicarb

116-06-3

Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate

117-81-7

Aldrin

309-00-2

Bis(tributyltin) oxide

56-35-9

Allyl alcohol

107-18-6

Bisphenol A

80-05-7

Allyl chloride

107-05-1

Bladex

21725-46-2

Aluminum (fume or dust)

7429-90-5

Bromoform

75-25-2

Aminobiphenyl:4-

92-67-1

Bromomethane

74-83-9

Ammonia z

7664-41-7

Bromoxynil

1689-84-5

Anilazine

101-05-3

Butadiene:1,3-

106-99-0

Aniline (and its salts)

62-53-3

Butyl alcohol:i-

78-83-1

Anisidine:o-

90-04-0

Butyl alcohol:n-

71-36-3

Anthracene

120-12-7

Butyl alcohol:sec-

78-92-2

Antimony

7440-36-0

Butyl alcohol:tert-

75-65-0

Aroclor 1016, 1X5ML, Transformer
Oil 50M G/KG
Aroclor 1254, 1X1ML, ISO,
1000UG/ML
Arsenic

12674-11-2

Butyl benzyl phthalate

85-68-7

Cadmium

7440-43-9

Captan

133-06-2

Carbaryl

63-25-2

Carbazole

86-74-8

Atrazine

1912-24-9

Carbendazim

10605-21-7

Azinphos-Methyl

86-50-0

Carbofuran

1563-66-2

Barium

7440-39-3

Carbon disulphide

75-15-0

Benomyl

17804-35-2

Carbon tetrachloride

56-23-5

Bentazone

25057-89-0

Catechol

120-80-9

Benzene

71-43-2

CFC-11

75-69-4

Benzene, 1-methyl-2-nitro-

88-72-2

CFC -113 Trichlorotrifluoroethane

76-13-1

Benzidine

92-87-5

CFC-12

75-71-8

Benzo(a)anthracene - PAH

56-55-3

Chlordane

57-74-9

75-05-8

11097-69-1
7440-38-2
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Chemical

CAS Number

Chemical

CAS Number

Chlorfenvinfos

470-90-6

Diazinon

333-41-5

Chloro-4-nitrobenzene:1-

100-00-5

Dibenzo(a,h)anthracene - PAH

53-70-3

Chloroacetic acid (and its salts)

79-11-8

Dibromoethane:1,2-

106-93-4

Chloroaniline:4

106-47-8

Dibromomethane

74-95-3

Chlorobenzene

108-90-7

Dibutyl phthalate

84-74-2

Chlorobutadine:2-1,3

126-99-8

Dicamba

1918-00-9

Chlorobutane:1

109-69-3

Dichlorobenzene Mixture

25321-22-6

Chlorodibromomethane

124-48-1

Dichlorobenzene:1,3

541-73-1

Chloroethane

75-00-3

Dichlorobenzene:o-

95-50-1

Chloroform

67-66-3

Dichlorobenzene:p-

106-46-7

Chloromethane

74-87-3

Dichlorobenzidine:3,3-

91-94-1

Chloromethyl methyl ether

107-30-2

Dichlorobromomethane

75-27-4

Chlorophenol:2-

95-57-8

Dichloroethane:1,2-

107-06-2

Chlorophos

52-68-6

Dichloroethylene:1,2-

540-59-0

Chloropropane:2-

75-29-6

Dichloroethylene-cis:1,2-

156-59-2

Chlorothalonil

1897-45-6

Dichloroethylene-trans:1,2-

156-60-5

Chlorotriphenyltin

639-58-7

Dichloromethane

75-09-2

Chlorpropham

101-21-3

Dichlorophenol (and its salts):2,4-

120-83-2

Chlorpyrifos

2921-88-2

Dichlorophenoxybutyric acid:2,4

94-82-6

Chromium

7440-47-3

Dichloropropane:1,2-

78-87-5

CIS-Heptachlorepoxide EXO-, Isomer
B
Cobalt

1024-57-3

Dichloropropene:1,3-

10061-01-5

Dichloropropene:1,3-

542-75-6

Copper

7440-50-8

Dichloropropene:trans 1,3-

10061-02-6

Coumaphos

56-72-4

Dichlorprop

120-36-5

Cresol (and its salts):m-

108-39-4

Dichlorvos

62-73-7

Cresol (and its salts):o-

95-48-7

Dicofol

115-32-2

Cresol (and its salts):p-

106-44-5

Dieldrin

60-57-1

Crotonaldehyde

4170-30-3

Diethanolamine (and its salts)

111-42-2

Cumene

98-82-8

Diethyl phthalate

84-66-2

Cyclohexane

110-82-7

Diethyl sulphate

64-67-5

Cyclohexanone

108-94-1

Dimethoate

60-51-5

Cyclohexen-1-one, 3,5,5-trimethyl-:2-

78-59-1

Dimethyl phthalate

131-11-3

Cymperator

52315-07-8

Dimethyl sulphate

77-78-1

Cyromazine

66215-27-8

Dimethylamine

124-40-3

DDD:P,P'

72-54-8

Dimethylaniline (and its salts):N,N-

121-69-7

DDE:4,4'

72-55-9

Dimethylhydrazine:1,2-

57-14-7

DDT:4,4'

50-29-3

Dimethylphenol:1,6-

576-26-1

Deltamethrin

52918-63-5

Dimethylphenol:2,4

105-67-9

Demeton

8065-48-3

Dinitrobenzene:1,2-

528-29-0

Demeton-S-Methyl Sulfoxide

301-12-2

Dinitrobenzene:1,3-

99-65-0

Diaminotoluene (and its salts):2,4-

95-80-7

Dinitrobenzene:1,4

100-25-4

Dinitro-o-cresol (and its salts):4,6-

534-52-1

7440-48-4
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Chemical

CAS Number

Chemical

CAS Number

Dinitrophenol:2,4-

51-28-5

Hexachloroethane

67-72-1

Dinitropropane:1,3-

6-1-25

Hexane:n-

110-54-3

Dinitrotoluene:2,4-

121-14-2

Hydrazine (and its salts)

302-01-2

Dinitrotoluene:2,6-

606-20-2

Hydrochloric acid

7647-01-0

Di-n-octyl phthalate

117-84-0

Hydrogen cyanide

74-90-8

Dioxane:1,4-

123-91-1

Hydrogen sulphide

7783-06-4

Diphenylamine

122-39-4

Hydroquinone (and its salts)

123-31-9

Diphenylhydrazine
(Hydrazobenzene):1,2Disulfoton

122-66-7

Indeno(1,2,3-c,d)pyrene - PAH

193-39-5

Iprodione

36734-19-7

Endrin

72-20-8

Isopropyl alcohol

67-63-0

Epichlorohydrin

106-89-8

Lead

7439-92-1

Eradicane

759-94-4

Linuron

330-55-2

Ethoprophos

13194-48-4

Malathion

121-75-5

Ethoxyethanol:2-

110-80-5

Maleic anhydride

108-31-6

Ethyl acrylate

140-88-5

Manganese

7439-96-5

Ethyl ether

60-29-7

Mecoprop

7085-19-0

Ethyl methacrylate

97-63-2

Mercury

7439-97-6

Ethylbenzene

100-41-4

Methacrylonitrile

126-98-7

Ethylene glycol

107-21-1

Methanol

67-56-1

Ethylene oxide

75-21-8

Methomyl

16752-77-5

Ethylene thiourea

96-45-7

Methoxychlor

72-43-5

Ethyleneimine

151-56-4

Methoxyethanol:2-

109-86-4

Fenitrothion

122-14-5

Methyl acetate

79-20-9

Fenthion

55-38-9

Methyl acrylate

96-33-3

Fentin acetate

900-95-8

Methyl ethyl ketone

78-93-3

Fluoranthene - PAH

206-44-0

Methyl iodide

74-88-4

Fluorene - PAH

86-73-7

Methyl isobutyl ketone

108-10-1

Folpet

133-07-3

Methyl mercury

22967-92-6

Formaldehyde

50-00-0

Methyl methacrylate

80-62-6

Formic acid

64-18-6

Methyl tert-butyl ether

1634-04-4

Furan

110-00-9

Methylchlorophenoxyacetic acid:2 -4-

94-74-6

Glyphosate

1071-83-6

Methylenedianiline:p,p'-

101-77-9

HCFC-142b

75-68-3

Methylhydrazine

60-34-4

HCFC-22

75-45-6

Metolachlor

51218-45-2

Heptachlor

76-44-8

Metribuzin

21087-64-9

Heptachlorodibenzofuran:1,2,3,4,6,7,8-

67562-39-4

Mevinphos

7786-34-7

Hexachlorobenzene

118-74-1

Molybdenum

7439-98-7

Hexachlorocyclohexane

319-84-6

Naphthalene

91-20-3

Hexachlorocyclohexane
(Lindane):gammaHexachlorocyclopentadiene

58-89-9

Naphthylamine-beta

91-59-8

Nickel

7440-02-0

77-47-4

Nitroaniline:2

88-74-4

70648-26-9

Nitrobenzene

98-95-3

Hexachlorodibenzofuran:1,2,3,4,7,8-

298-04-4
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Chemical

CAS Number

Chemical

CAS Number

Nitrogen Dioxide

10102-44-0
55-63-0

Nitrophenol (and its salts):p-

100-02-7

Nitropropane:2-

79-46-9

Tetrachlorodibenzofuran
(TEQ):2,3,7,8Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin
(TEQ):2,3,7,8Tetrachloroethane:1,1,1,2-

51207-31-9

Nitroglycerin

Nitrosodiphenylamine:N-

86-30-6

Tetrachloroethane:1,1,2,2-

79-34-5

Nitrotoluene:3

99-08-1

Tetrachloroethylene

127-18-4

Orthene

30560-19-1

Tetrachlorophenol:2,3,4,6-

58-90-2

Oxamyl

23135-22-0

Tetramethylthiuram disulphide

137-26-8

Oxybis(1-chloropropane):2-

108-60-1

Thallium

7440-28-0

Parathion

56-38-2

Thiophenol

108-98-5

Parathion-methyl

298-00-0

Thiosulfan

115-29-7

Pentachlorobenzene

608-93-5

Thiourea

62-56-6

Pentachlorodibenzofuran:2,3,4,7,8-

57117-31-4

Tin (and its compounds)

7440-31-5

Pentachloronitrobenzene

82-68-8

Tolclofos-methyl

57018-04-9

Pentachlorophenol (PCP)

87-86-5

Toluene

108-88-3

Permethrin

52645-53-1

Toluidine:o-

95-53-4

Phenol (and its salts)

108-95-2

Toluidine:p-

106-49-0

Phenylenediamine (and its salts):p-

106-50-3

Toxaphene

8001-35-2

Phenylenediamine:m-

108-45-2

Triallate

2303-17-5

Phenylphenol (and its salts):o-

90-43-7

Triazophos

24017-47-8

Phosgene

75-44-5

Tributylphosphorotrithioate:1,2,4-

78-48-8

Phoxim

14816-18-3

Trichlorobenzene:1,2,4-

120-82-1

Phthalic anhydride

85-44-9

71-55-6

Picric Acid

88-89-1

Pirimicarb

23103-98-2

Trichloroethane/methyl
chloroform:1,1,1Trichloroethane:1,1,2-

Propachlor

1918-16-7

Trichloroethylene

79-01-6

Propoxur

114-26-1

Trichlorophenol:2,4,5-

95-95-4

Trichlorophenol:2,4,6-

88-06-2

Trichlorophenoxyacetic acid:2,4,5-

93-76-5

Trichloropropane:1,2,3-

96-18-4

Triethylamine

121-44-8

Trifluralin

1582-09-8

Trimethylbenzene:1,2,4-

95-63-6

Trinitrotouene:2,4,6

118-96-7

Urea, N'-(3,4-dichlorophenyl)-N,NdimethylVanadium (except when in an alloy)
and its compounds
Vinyl acetate

330-54-1

Vinyl bromide

593-60-2

Vinyl chloride

75-01-4

Vinylidene chloride

75-35-4

Xylene (all isomers)

1330-20-7

Propylene

115-07-1

Propylene oxide

75-56-9

Propyzamide

23950-58-5

Pyrazophos

13457-18-6

Pyrene - PAH

129-00-0

Pyridine (and its salts)

110-86-1

Quinoline (and its salts)

91-22-5

Safrole

94-59-7

Selenium

7782-49-2

Silver

7440-22-4

Simazine

122-34-9

Styrene

100-42-5

Styrene oxide

96-09-3

Sulphur dioxide

7446-09-5

Tetrachlorobenzene:1,2,4,5

95-94-3
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1746-01-6
630-20-6

79-00-5

7440-62-2
108-05-4

Chemical

CAS Number

Xylene:m-

108-38-3

Xylene:o-

95-47-6

Xylene:p-

106-42-3

Zinc (fume or dust)

7440-66-6

Zineb

12122-67-7

zzAcetone - [MOE]

67-64-1

zzDichloroethane:1,1- - [MOE]

75-34-3

zzEthyl acetate - [MOE]

141-78-6

zzHexachloro-1,3-butadiene - [MOE]

87-68-3
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Appendix B:
List of Industries Examined in the Analysis
US SIC
101
Code===
102
104
106
131
149
229
242
249
261
262
281
282
284
286
287
289
291
308
323
324
331
334
335
341
344
346
347
349
351
353
364
371
399
491
495
501

CAN SIC
0617
0612
0611
0613
0711
0629
1999
2512
2592
2711
2719
3721
3731
3761
3712
3721
3799
3611
1699
3562
3521
2919
3922
2961
3042
3049
3049
3041
3099
3251
3192
3333
3251
3999
4911
4999
5529

Industry
Iron ores
Copper ores
Gold and silver ores
Ferroalloy ores, excluding Vanadium
Crude petroleum and natural gas
Miscellaneous nonmetallic minerals
Miscellaneous textile goods
Sawmills and planing mills
Miscellaneous wood products
Pulp mills
Mills, excluding building paper
Industrial inorganic compounds
Plastics materials and synthetics
Soaps, cleaners, and toilet goods
Industrial organic chemicals
Agricultural chemicals
Miscellaneous chemical products
Petroleum refining
Miscellaneous plastics products, not elsewhere classified
Products of purchased glass
Cement, hydraulic
Blast furnace and basic steel products
Secondary nonferrous metals
Nonferrous rolling and drawing
Metal cans and shipping containers
Fabricated structural metal products
Metal forgings and stampings
Metal services, not elsewhere classified
Miscellaneous fabricated metal products
Engines and turbines
Construction and related machinery
Electric lighting and wiring equipment
Motor vehicles and equipment
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Electric services
Sanitary services
Motor vehicles, parts and equipment
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Appendix C:
Reflexivity Statement
While this dissertation is quantitative by nature, it remains possible that my prior experiences
and beliefs shaped not only the research itself, but also my interpretations of the analysis. Therefore, I
am providing a reflexivity statement to allow the reader to consider the ways in which my
involvement in the research may have acted upon and informed these studies (Nightingale &
Cromby, 1999).
I am a middle aged white male raised in the south central United States. Prior to pursuing a
PhD, I earned a bachelor of business administration in management and marketing and a master of
business administration from two conservative universities. I spent nearly ten years working in the
international banking software industry and my former career provided opportunities to work and live
in the U.K., Germany, Switzerland, Mexico, and Panama as well as numerous cities in the United
States and Canada.
My impetus for returning to university to pursue a PhD in business administration was
reading Jarrod Diamond’s book, Collapse. While I have always enjoyed nature, neither I nor anyone
close to me has been directly impacted by environmental degradation or chemicals in the
environment. Collapse simply encouraged me to more thoughtfully consider how businesses impact
the natural environment, if society would be able to interpret the warning signs of an ailing
environment, and if and how businesses could respond to prevent irrevocable harm. I specifically
decided to pursue my studies within the school of business, because I wanted to focus on business
solutions to environmental externalities.
I believe that managers collectively aspire to minimize their businesses’ environmental
impacts but primarily focus on economic considerations when making business decisions. I believe
that the vast majority of firms abide by society’s expectations defined within laws and regulations but
that managers struggle to adopt socially desired change in the absence of strategic incentives,
economic enticement, or uniform standards. I believe that sustainability research has the greatest
opportunity to bring about timely and meaningful change when it provides an open, honest, and
balanced dialogue about the challenges and opportunities that society and organizations face together.
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Appendix D:
Ethics Approval for Preliminary Interviews
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November, 2010.
AWARDS & RECOGNITIONS











Centre for Building Sustainable Value Research Award (2013)
ERA/Ivey Doctoral Fellowship (2012 – 2013)
Brock Scholarship (2009 – 2013)
Ivey Plan of Excellence (2009 - 2013)
ARCS PhD Sustainability Academy (2012)
Syracuse University Graduate Award (2007 – 2009)
Oklahoma State University Graduate Award (1995 – 1997)
Beta Gamma Sigma () – International Honor Society of Business
Phi Kappa Phi () – International Honor Society
Sigma Iota Epsilon () – National Business Management Honorarium
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TEACHING
Periodic
Annual

Ivey Business School
Guest Lecturer/Facilitator, Corporations & Society (HBA core)

Fall 2008

Syracuse University
Instructor, Introduction to Strategic Management (Management core)
Student Evaluation: 4.5/5.0
Nominated for the 2007-2008 Whitman Outstanding Student Teacher Award

Primary Teaching Interests: Business Strategy & Sustainability
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT
2013
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2011
2011
2011
2010
2008

Journal of Management Science Paper Development Workshop
Ivey Experimental Economics Conference
Summer Program in Data Analysis (SPIDA)
Ivey Sustainability Conference
AOM ONE Doctoral Student Consortium
Multi-disciplinary Environmental Sustainability Workshops
Survivor Data Analysis Workshop
Social Sciences Data Analysis Workshop: Logit & Probit Models
Research Generativity & Productivity Workshop
Research Data Centre Longitudinal Data Analysis Workshop
AOM New Doctoral Student Consortium

Denver, CO
London, ON
Toronto, ON
London, ON
Boston, MA
London, ON
London, ON
London, ON
London, ON
London, ON
Los Angeles, CA

SERVICE
2013 2013 2013 2013
2012
2008 - 2012
2010 - 2011
2010 - 2011
2010
2008
2008

AACSB Assessment of Learning Committee, Simmons School of Managemnet
Research Data & Technology Task Force, Simmons School of Management
Academic Advisor (CSR), Simmons School of Management
Reviewer, Strategic Management Society Conference
New member mentor, Academy of Management Conference
Annual reviewer, Academy of Management Conference (BPS & ONE)
Vice President External, Ivey PhD Association
PhD Orientation Chair, Ivey PhD Association
Judge, Network for Building Sustainable Value Sustainability in Business Award
Sustainable Enterprise Partnership Conference, Syracuse NY
Session Chair, Academy of Management (PNP)

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS




Academy of Management
Alliance for Research on Corporate Sustainability
Strategic Management Society
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PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
2001 - 2006

Outgoing position: Regional Account Manager
Incoming position: Technical Consultant
Temenos, USA Inc.
Select client list: Banco Santander International, Bank of China, Bank Leumi, Credit
Lyonnais, Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, Fleet/First Boston, National Bank of
Greece, RBTT

1997 - 2001

Outgoing position: Systems Analyst / Consultant
Incoming position: Business Analyst / Consultant
EDS - Globus Centre of Expertise
Select client list: Banco Santander International, Banque Edouard Constant, Dresdner
Bank Lateinamerika, Temenos, Enron

CERTIFICATIONS



Project Management Professional, Project Management Institute, since 2004
Executive Certificate in Negotiation, University of Notre Dame Mendoza College of
Business, 2006
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